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SEPARATION, DEPORTATION, TERMINATION 
Marcia Yablon-Zug* 
Abstract: There is a growing practice of separating immigrant children 
from their deportable parents. Parental fitness is no longer the standard 
with regard to undocumented immigrant parents. Increasingly, fit un-
documented parents must convince courts and welfare agencies that 
continuing or resuming parental custody is in their child’s best interest. 
This requirement is unique to immigrant parents and can have a disas-
trous impact on their ability to retain custody of their children. Best in-
terest decisions are highly subjective and courts and agencies increas-
ingly base their custody determinations on subjective criteria such as 
negative perceptions regarding undocumented immigrants and their 
countries of origin, and on extremely positive beliefs regarding the 
benefits of an American upbringing. For undocumented parents facing 
deportation, this is a disastrous combination. Courts and agencies fre-
quently conclude that allowing a child to leave with a deported parent, 
return to a foreign country, and forgo childhood in the United States is 
not in the child’s best interest. Replacing the parental rights standard 
with a best interest of the child standard in the context of undocu-
mented immigrant families is the latest example of the increasing power 
of the children’s rights movement. This, however, is a drastic change 
and one that must receive considerable attention and consideration be-
fore it is permitted to continue. 
Introduction 
 On a Tuesday afternoon in late September of 2009, Maria Gurrolla 
was caring for her newborn son.1 She had just returned home from 
running errands when a black police style sedan pulled up in front of 
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1 See Gabriel Falcon, Update: Amber Alert for Abducted Newborn, Anderson Cooper 360° 
CNN Blog, (Sept. 30, 2009, 10:37 AM), http://ac360.blogs.cnn.com/2009/09/30/update- 
amber-alert-for-abducted-newborn. 
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her house. A blonde woman exited the car and knocked on Gurrolla’s 
door. The woman falsely identified herself as an immigration official 
and then demanded Gurrolla’s baby. When Gurrolla refused, the 
woman stabbed her eight times and abducted her child.2 
 Gurrolla survived, and shortly after the abduction police located 
the woman and returned the baby.3 Just moments after being reunited 
with his mother, however, the state took the baby and his siblings into 
custody based on allegations that a family member had attempted to sell 
the child.4 The allegations were unfounded, and eventually, the family 
reunited.5 
 Maria Gurrolla’s son was taken twice, first by a kidnapper and then 
by the state.6 Perhaps more than anything else, it is the combination of 
                                                                                                                      
 
2 See id.; Kristin M. Hall & Desiree Hunter, Kidnapped Baby Found: State Reunites Mother 
and Child, Then Takes Custody ff Kids, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 4, 2009, 2:58 AM), http:// 
www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/10/04/kidnapped-baby-found-stat_n_308936.html. 
3 Baby Snatch Victim Loses Kids to State Custody, FOX NEWS, (Oct. 4, 2009), http://www. 
foxnews.com/us/2009/10/04/baby-snatch-victim-loses-kids-state-custody. 
4 Chris Echegaray & Kate Howard, Reunited: Baby Is Home; Parents Are in the Clear, TEN-
NESSEAN, Oct. 7, 2009, at 1A. The public perception of Hispanic—and particularly un-
documented Hispanic—immigrants as bad parents is an issue discussed in Part V below. See 
infra notes 329-349. 
5 Echegaray & Howard, supra note 4. State officials, however, were so inclined to be-
lieve the allegations that they were willing to order state placement over placement with 
relatives, adding to the trauma experienced by these children. See Travis Loller, Relatives 
Question Why Officials Took Tenn. Baby, SEATTLE TIMES (Oct. 8, 2009), http://seattletimes.nw 
source.com/html/nationworld/2010025222_apustennbabysnatched.html. Maria’s three-
year old daughter, who had witnessed her mother’s stabbing, found this separation espe-
cially traumatic; her trauma resulted in an illness that required hospitalization. Id. In addi-
tion, even after reunification, the investigation of the child trafficking allegations contin-
ued as police interviewed other family members. See Echegaray & Howard, supra note 4. 
6 See Loller, supra note 5. Gurrolla’s case is not unique. According to Cathy Nahirny, a 
senior analyst with the National Center for Missing & Exploited Children, “there have 
been at least two other recent cases where an abductor used a ploy similar to the one used 
in this case.” Hall & Hunter, supra note 2; see also E-Mail from Monzer Mansour, Attorney at 
Law, to author (Aug. 5, 2009, 11:37 AM) (on file with author) (“I litigated a case almost 
two years ago where my client, here illegally, was defrauded and intimidated by a childless 
couple into consenting to a permanent guardianship of my client’s infant with no contact 
permitted between the child and the natural mother. The invidious goal was to eventually 
adopt the baby. After a one day trial, the judge thankfully decided in favor of my client and 
ordered the return of her baby after about a year or more of separation.”); Rich Phillips, 
Florida Parents Reunited with Baby Taken for 6 Months, CNN Just. (Feb. 3, 2010), http:// 
articles.cnn.com/2010-02-03/justice/florida.baby.returned_1_parents-child-florida-couple? 
_s=PM:CRIME (describing the abduction of an undocumented immigrant couple’s child 
by a woman who “‘used threats and intimidation against the parents to have control and 
access to the child. She threatened to deport them and report them to DCF (the Florida 
Department of Children and Families) to try and control them . . . .’”). “‘We need to get 
the word out to our immigrant communities,’ Nahirny said . . . . [I]mmigrant families have 
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these events that demonstrate the unique vulnerabilities of undocu-
mented immigrant families like Gurrolla’s. If the issue were sympathies, 
it would be hard to find a more sympathetic mother than Gurrolla; she 
nearly lost her life attempting to protect her son.7 Nevertheless, when 
the state received information regarding the potential, although 
unlikely and unsupported, threat of harm to Gurrolla’s child, her sacri-
fices for her son were irrelevant and the harm that such removal could 
cause Gurrolla was immaterial.8 The state needed only a single accusa-
tion to question Gurrolla’s parental fitness and order the removal of 
her children.9 
 Gurrolla’s case raises two serious concerns. The first is the state’s 
decision to focus on what it perceived to be her children’s best interests 
rather than Gurrolla’s parental rights. The second is that Gurrolla’s un-
documented status appears to have increased the likelihood of having 
her parental fitness called into question. The Gurrolla case is troubling 
and, even if it were an isolated incident, the concerns it raises would still 
be worthy of discussion. The Gurrolla case, however, is not unique.10 
More than two dozen similar incidents have occurred across the United 
States, revealing that certain modes of reasoning and argument can ef-
                                                                                                                      
been targets of child abductions because of the assumption they will not tell police.” Hall 
& Hunter, supra note 2. 
7 See Echegaray & Howard, supra note 4. 
8 See Loller, supra note 5. 
9 See Echegaray & Howard, supra note 4; Loller, supra note 5. 
10 See Ginger Thompson, After Losing Freedom, Some Immigrants Face Loss of Custody of Their 
Children, N.Y. Times, Apr. 23, 2009, at A15 (addressing the story of Encarnación Bail Romero 
and her son Carlos, stating that “lawyers and advocates for immigrants say that cases like his 
are popping up across the country as crackdowns against illegal immigrants thrust local 
courts into transnational custody battles and leave thousands of children in limbo”); Tele-
phone Interview with Chris Huck, lawyer for Bail Romero and Maria Luis, DLA Piper (Aug. 
13, 2009) (stating that he knew of maybe 12 cases from Nebraska alone, but noting that such 
cases are “rarely appealed”); see also Nina Rabin, Disappearing Parents: Immigration Enforcement 
and the Child Welfare System, 44 Conn. L. Rev. 99, 115 (2011) (describing the results of 52 sur-
veys and 20 interviews, which revealed that the majority of the lawyers, case workers, and 
judges in the immigrant family separation cases surveyed had encountered “cases in which 
one or more family members were in detention facilities . . . at least one to five times in the 
past five years, and many reported encounters with such cases significantly more than five 
times in the past five years”); Andrew Becker & Anna Gorman, Nonviolent Crimes and Deporta-
tion, L.A. Times, Apr. 15, 2009, at A20 (“The Human Rights Watch report estimates the de-
portations have caused the separation of more than 1 million family members.”); Julie Gil-
bert Rosicky & Felicity Sackville Northcott, Expanding the Meaning of Interjurisdictional: 
International Issues in Child Welfare, Int’l Soc. Service: U.S. Branch, Inc., http://www.iss-
usa.org/uploads/file/Expanding%20the%20Meaning%20of%20Interjurisdictional.pdf (not-
ing that one of the ways children become separated from their families is when “[p]arent(s) 
are sent to their home country through immigration enforcement—the child is a US citizen 
and is taken in to social service custody”). 
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fectively facilitate the removal of children from their undocumented 
immigrant parents and justify the termination of parental rights.11 
  Parents have a constitutional right to the care and control of their 
children and, under established case law, courts may not terminate the 
rights of fit parents.12 The Tennessee Department of Children’s Ser-
vices returned Gurrolla’s children but, in many similar cases, the paren-
tal rights of undocumented immigrants are ignored and replaced with 
a best interest of the child standard. This best interest standard is then 
used to justify terminating the undocumented parent’s rights.13 The 
movement to replace the parental rights standard with a best interest of 
the child standard has been growing over the 1990s and through the 
new millennium but, in the context of immigrant children best interest 
considerations, are poised to supplant all other considerations when 
determining the care and custody of immigrant children.14 
 This Article explores the issue of immigrant family separations and 
parental rights terminations and analyzes the legal, social, and bureau-
cratic frameworks in which these decisions occur. Part I of this Article 
shows that removing immigrant children from parental care conflicts 
with both established constitutional principles regarding family integrity 
and assumptions undergirding traditional immigration law. Part II dem-
onstrates that, despite this conflict, removals are in strong accord with 
the changing focus of family law and policy. Specifically, the removal of 
children from undocumented parents is the result of the success and 
substantial influence of the Children’s Rights Movement and its empha-
sis on best interest considerations. Part III discusses cases involving the 
                                                                                                                      
11 See Posting of Norman Pflanz, npflanz@neappleseed.org, to help-immigemplrights 
@yahoogrups.com ( Jul. 30, 2009) (on file with author) (describing a study by Nebraska 
Appleseed that revealed: “1. The Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services 
removes children of non-citizens from their parents at higher rates than children of citi-
zens. 2. Immigrant families are more likely not to be provided a case plan in their native 
language nor informed about local resources available to them. 3. Once in the system, 
these families face language, cultural, and oftentimes, geographic barriers to receiving 
services necessary for reunification. 4. Based on these factors, immigrant families are more 
likely to be broken apart than families in which all members are U.S. citizens”). 
12 See Elizabeth Bartholet, Taking Adoption Seriously: Radical Revolution or Modest Revision-
ism?, 28 Cap. U. L. Rev. 77, 85–86 (1999); infra notes 49–60 and accompanying text. 
13 See, e.g., In re Angelica L., 767 N.W.2d 74, 94 (Neb. 2009); Anita C. v. Superior Court, 
No. B213283, 2009 WL 2859068, at *9 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 8, 2009); infra notes 270–309 
and accompanying text. 
14 See, e.g., Elizabeth Bartholet, The Racial Disproportionality Movement in Child Welfare: 
False Facts and Dangerous Directions, 51 Ariz. L. Rev.871, 897 (2009) (discussing the rise of 
the children’s rights movement and the increasing focus on best interest analyses); infra 
notes 54–65 and accompanying text. In fact, the reach and importance of the best interest 
analysis has been steadily increasing since the 1990s. 
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termination of parental rights of undocumented parents. These cases 
demonstrate the power and persuasiveness of best interest arguments 
and the receptiveness of courts and agencies to those arguments. Part IV 
discusses the lack of court and state agency consideration for immigrant 
parents’ post-deportation circumstances in best interest analyses. Part V 
summarizes the arguments that states and agencies use to persuade 
courts that permanently removing children from the care of fit but un-
documented parents is in the child’s best interest. Finally, Part VI dis-
cusses the problems with relying on a best interest standard, looking to 
American history for comparisons and also examines whether these re-
movals have gone too far and exceeded public support for elevating 
children’s rights over parental rights. The broader normative question 
of whether such removals are justifiable on moral or policy grounds, 
and whether the law can and should be changed to permit them, are 
explored in a companion article.15 
I. Overview of the Termination of Parental Rights 
 For decades, the law has struggled with the tension between chil-
dren’s rights and parental rights. Although not inevitable, the recogni-
tion of one has often meant the diminishment of the other. U.S. case 
law has long favored parental rights over children’s rights and, absent a 
clear showing of serious, perhaps detrimental harm, courts did not 
question parental decisions concerning children.16 As long as a paren-
tal decision was not gravely injurious, the fact that it might not be in the 
child’s best interest was irrelevant.17 Cases covering a wide range of is-
sues—from minors’ marriages, abortions, discipline, and speech—all 
demonstrate the deference given to parental decisions concerning 
their children, even when such deference comes at the expense of a 
child’s best interest.18 
                                                                                                                      
 
15 See generally Marcia Zug, Should I Stay or Should I Go: Why Immigrant Reunification Deci-
sions Should Be Based on the Best Interest of the Child, 2011 BYU L. Rev. 1139 (discussing the 
moral and policy justifications of removal and suggesting a shifting standard for when to 
use a parental rights or best interest analysis). 
16 See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65–66 (2000); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 
205, 229–30 (1972); Willis v. State, 888 N.E.2d 177, 180 (Ind. 2008). 
17 See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65–66; Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1981); Stanley v. 
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651(1972). 
18 See, e.g., Troxel, 530 U.S. at 75 (noting that a state law that allowed any third party to 
petition for child visitation rights over parental objections violated the fundamental right 
of parents to raise their children); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 
899–900 (1992) (holding that the state may require that an unemancipated woman under 
the age of eighteen obtain informed parental consent, even if this requires an in-person 
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A. The Parental Rights Doctrine 
 Every day, hundreds, perhaps thousands of parents lose custody of 
their children.19 The standard for initial removal is often low.20 Chil-
dren are typically removed due to allegations of abuse and neglect and, 
in a handful of states, children can even be removed when courts simply 
determine that removal is in their “best interest.”21 Unlike removal, 
however, the standard for termination is rigorous and is not solely based 
on a child’s best interest.22 When considering termination of parental 
rights, a best interest analysis is an appropriate consideration only after a 
finding of unfitness.23 Parents have a constitutional right to the care and 
custody of their children and only unfit parents lose this right.24 
                                                                                                                      
 
visit by the parent to the facility and the imposition of a twenty-four-hour waiting period); 
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 234 (holding that the state cannot compel school attendance past eighth 
grade, as this requirement would violate the fundamental right to direct the religious up-
bringing of children); Willis, 888 N.E.2d at 184 (setting aside the conviction of a parent 
who used physical force to discipline her child on the basis of parental privilege). 
19 See The AFCARS Report, U.S. Department Health & Human Services, Admin. for 
Child. & Fam. (Oct. 2009), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/stats_research/afcars/ 
tar/report16.htm (finding that 273,000 children entered foster care in 2008). 
20 See Theo Liebmann, What’s Missing from Foster Care Reform? The Need for Comprehensive, 
Realistic, and Compassionate Removal Standards, 28 Hamline J. Pub. L. & Pol’y 141, 145 (2006) 
(describing the standard as having a “remarkably narrow and short-sighted perspective”). 
21 See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 19-1-115 (2011) (allowing a court to remove a child 
from his or her home according to the child’s best interest); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 119, 
§ 29C (2010) (allowing removal when continuation the in home is contrary to the child’s 
best interest); Or. Rev. Stat. § 419B.150(2)(b) (2009) (allowing protective custody when 
it is in best interests of child). The majority of states require “that the risk of harm in the 
child’s home be analyzed, and if that risk meets a certain level—usually ‘imminent,’ ‘seri-
ous’ or some combination thereof—then a removal is deemed warranted.” See Liebmann, 
supra note 20, at 145–46; see, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-129(B)(1) (2011) (allowing re-
moval when the child is in immediate danger and it is necessary to ensure the child’s 
safety); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 587A–8 (2011) (allowing removal when continued placement 
with the parents presents a risk of imminent harm); 705 Ill. Comp. Stat. 405/2-10 (1999) 
(allowing removal when there is an immediate and urgent necessity for the safety and pro-
tection of the child); Ind. Code § 31-34-2-3(a)(1) (2011) (allowing removal when a child’s 
physical or mental condition will be seriously impaired or endangered if not immediately 
taken into custody); Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law § 5-709(a)(2) (LexisNexis 2011) (allowing 
removal for a child in serious, immediate danger); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 210.125.2 (2011) (al-
lowing removal for a child in imminent danger of serious physical harm or upon a threat 
to his or her life). 
22 See, e.g., In re D.T., 818 N.E.2d 1214, 1227 (Ill. 2004); In re Terrance G., 731 N.Y.S.2d 
832, 847 (Fam. Ct. 2001). 
23 See, e.g., In re D.T., 818 N.E.2d at 1227 (explaining that once a parent is found unfit, 
then all considerations must yield to the best interest of the child); In re P.L., 778 N.W. 2d 
33, 36 (Iowa 2010) (noting that in the 1970s “scholars began questioning the best interest 
standard used by the courts to terminate parental rights” and that this standard was ulti-
mately rejected because a best interests test “provided little or no guidance for the court in 
deciding when to terminate a parent’s parental rights”); In re Terrance G., 731 N.Y.S.2d at 
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 In the 1972 case of Stanley v. Illinois, the Supreme Court struck 
down an Illinois state law automatically depriving unmarried fathers of 
custody of their biological children upon the death of the mother.25 
The statute in Stanley reflected the state’s assumption that being raised 
by a single father is not in a child’s best interest.26 The Supreme Court 
found this consideration irrelevant.27 The Stanley Court held that, 
unless a parent is shown to be unfit, the parent has the constitutional 
right to the care and upbringing of his or her children.28 Therefore, 
the Court found it unconstitutional to require the father to prove that 
he had a right to raise his children.29 
 Ten years later, the Court decided Santosky v. Kramer.30 The Santosky 
Court declared unconstitutional a New York statute permitting deter-
minations of “permanent neglect” to be based on a “fair preponder-
ance of the evidence.”31 The Court explained that the parental right to 
the care and custody of children is a fundamental liberty interest and 
concluded that, before a state may terminate parental rights, it must 
support its allegations by at least “clear and convincing evidence.”32 
 Then, in June of 2000, the Supreme Court decided Troxel v. Gran-
ville, reaffirming the importance of parental rights and the inapplicabil-
                                                                                                                      
847 (“‘In many cases the State may, and under some legal systems undoubtedly does, find 
“better” parents for a child even though the natural parents may be willing and able to 
provide proper care.’ But it is fundamental to our legal and social system, that it is in the 
best interest of a child to be raised by his parents, unless the parents are unfit . . . .”) (in-
ternal citation omitted) (quoting In re Sanjivini K., 391 N.E.2d 1316, 1321 (N.Y. 1971)); 
Developments in the Law: The Law of Marriage and Family, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 1996, 2119 
(2003) (arguing that the state’s role must be “restricted to the goal of ensuring parental 
fitness, not extended to protect the relative and potentially imprecise ‘best interest’ of the 
child”); Michael S. Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of “Neglected” Children: Standards for Re-
moval of Children from Their Homes, Monitoring the Status of Children in Foster Care, and Termina-
tion of Parental Rights, 28 Stan. L. Rev. 623, 637 (1976). 
24 See, e.g., Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753 (describing this right as “a fundamental liberty in-
terest”). 
25 Stanley, 405 U.S. at 658. 
26 See id. at 648. 
27 See id. at 654–55, 658. 
28 See id. at 658. 
29 See id.; see also Santosky, 455 U.S. at 767 (explaining that a child may only be removed 
and placed in another home “‘when it is clear that the natural parent cannot or will not pro-
vide a normal family home for the child’”) (quoting N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 384-b.1(a)(iv) 
(McKinney 2011). 
30 Santosky, 455 U.S. at 770. 
31 See id. at 748, 768. 
32 Id. at 769; see also Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 
846–47 (1977) (refusing to grant constitutional protections to foster parents that would 
infringe on the constitutional right of parents to the care and custody of their children). 
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ity of a best interest standard. 33 The Troxel Court described the “inter-
est of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children [a]s 
perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by 
[the] Court” and held that 
                                                                                                                     
so long as a parent adequately cares for his or her children 
(i.e., is fit), there will normally be no reason for the State to 
inject itself into the private realm of the family to further 
question the ability of that parent to make the best decisions 
concerning the rearing of that parent’s children.34 
 These Supreme Court cases illustrate what is often referred to as 
the parental rights doctrine.35 This doctrine holds that children should 
remain with their birth parents “and that the state should play an ex-
tremely limited role in overseeing the conditions of their lives . . . .”36 
These cases reflect the strong constitutional protections afforded paren-
tal rights and the limited role the government is expected to play in su-
pervising what occurs within the family.37 Put simply, this means that 
parents must exercise a minimum degree of care and, unless they are 
found to be unfit for falling below this low standard of care, the state 
may not interfere with the custody and care of their children.38 Conse-
 
33 See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 72–73. 
34 Id. at 65, 68–69; see also id. at 96 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“For that reason, ‘[s]hort of 
preventing harm to the child,’ the court considered the best interests of the child to be ‘in-
sufficient to serve as a compelling state interest overruling a parent’s fundamental rights.’”) 
(quoting In re Smith, 969 P.2d 21, 30 (Wash. 1998)); Martin Guggenheim, What’s Wrong 
with Children’s Rights 38–39 (2005) (“The parental rights doctrine protects parents from 
having to defend their right to their children’s custody on grounds that parental custody 
would further the children’s best interests. A best interests inquiry is not a neutral investiga-
tion that leads to an obvious result. It is an intensely value-laden inquiry. And it cannot be 
otherwise.”). 
35 See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 72–75; Santosky, 455 U.S. at 767; Stanley, 405 U.S. at 648; see also 
Annette Ruth Appell, Virtual Mothers and the Meaning of Parenthood, 34 U. Mich. J. L. Re-
form 683, 688–89 (2001) (“‘Parental rights doctrine’ refers to the . . . doctrine that defines 
parents and limits intervention into the family.”). 
36 Guggenheim, supra note 34, at 36. 
37 See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 72–75; Santosky, 455 U.S. at 767; Stanley, 405 U.S. at 648; see also 
Guggenheim, supra note 34, at 36 (stating that, under this doctrine, the government’s role 
is limited to defining the “outer limits of what is acceptable parenting”). “Government 
bureaucracies (‘impersonal political institutions’ in the language of the Supreme Court) 
have been criticized for being inept at many functions.” Guggenheim, supra note 34, at 38. 
Therefore, because government bureaucracies are likely inept in making best interest ana-
lyses, they should limit—rather than encourage—their own involvement in such decisions. 
See id. This doctrine thus prevents “state officials, who will never know children better than 
the adults who have directly nurtured them, from making childrearing decisions.” Id. 
38 See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 72–75; Santosky, 455 U.S. at 767; Stanley, 405 U.S. at 648; Gug-
genheim, supra note 34, at 36. 
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quently, the current state of the law regarding parental rights can be 
described as a fitness standard.39 It is not a best interest of the child 
standard.40 
B. Immigrant Parents’ Rights 
 The constitutional rights of parents are not confined to citizens.41 
Immigrant parents also have the right to the care and custody of their 
children, and U.S. immigration law assumes that immigrant parents will 
retain custody of their children regardless of immigration status.42 In 
fact, immigration decisions are often based on the assumption that 
children and parents will be reunited in the parents’ country of origin 
after deportation.43 
 For example, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) specifically 
held that, when an alien-parent’s child “is below the age of discretion, 
. . . it is his parents’ decision whether to take him along to leave him in 
this country when and if they are deported.”44 Many courts have re-
peatedly affirmed this conclusion.45 In fact, immigration authorities are 
so skeptical of parents’ claims that deportation will result in separation 
                                                                                                                      
39 See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 72–75; Santosky, 455 U.S. at 767; Stanley, 405 U.S. at 648; Gug-
genheim, supra note 34, at 36–37. 
40 See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 72–75; Santosky, 455 U.S. at 767; Stanley, 405 U.S. at 648; Gug-
genheim, supra note 34, at 36–37. 
41 See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886). The Su-
preme Court has held that constitutional protections of the “Fourteenth Amendment . . . 
[are] not confined to the protection of citizens . . . . [The] provisions are universal in their 
application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differ-
ences of race, of color, or of nationality . . . .” Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 369; see also Plyler v. Doe, 
457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982) (“Whatever his status under the immigration laws, an alien is 
surely a ‘person’ in any ordinary sense of that term.”). That Congress’s power over immi-
gration is considered plenary means two things: “[f]irst, Congress’s authority to regulate 
immigration derives not from any constitutionally enumerated power, but rather is ‘inher-
ent’ in the United States’ ‘sovereignty’ as an independent nation. Second, in its exercise of 
that authority, Congress—and, by delegation, the Executive—is buffered against judicially 
enforceable constitutional constraints.” Matthew J. Lindsay, Immigration as Invasion: Sover-
eignty, Security, and the Origins of the Federal Immigration Power, 45 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 1, 3 
(2010). 
42 See Newton v. INS, 736 F.2d 336, 343 (6th Cir. 1984); Ayala-Flores v. INS, 662 F.2d 
444, 446 (6th Cir. 1981); In re B & J, 756 N.W.2d 234, 239–40 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008) (citing 
Liu v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 13 F.3d 1175, 1177 (8th Cir. 1994)). 
43 See Newton, 736 F.2d at 343; Ayala-Flores, 662 F.2d at 446; In re B & J, 756 N.W.2d at 
239–40. 
44 Liu, 13 F.3d at 1177; see also Newton, 736 F.2d at 343; Ayala-Flores, 662 F.2d at 446; In re 
B & J, 756 N.W.2d at 240 n.5 (citing Liu, 13 F.3d at 1177). 
45 See Marcia Zug, Deporting Grandma: Why Grandparent Deportation May Be the Next Big 
Immigration Crisis and How to Solve It, 43 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 193, 218–19 (2009) (providing 
examples of many similar immigration decisions). 
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from their children that parents must present significant proof that 
they will not take the children with them upon deportation.46 Even 
then, the BIA has held that “absent proof of extreme hardship to a 
child if he returns to his parents’ native country with them, [it] will 
generally consider the decision to leave the child in the United States 
to be a matter of personal choice.”47 Consequently, regardless of status, 
immigrants have the same legal right to the care and custody of their 
children as all other American parents.48 
II. The Controversial Rise of the Children’s Rights Movement 
 Parents have a constitutional right to the care and custody of their 
children.49 Moreover, the constitutional rights of parents are not con-
fined to citizens, as immigrant parents also have the right to the care 
and custody of their children.50 Since the mid-1990s, however, the tra-
ditional deference accorded to parental rights has weakened.51 Increas-
ingly, critics are calling for best interest considerations to trump paren-
                                                                                                                      
46 See id. at 219. Parents claiming that deportation will result in separation, thereby 
creating extreme hardship, must present the government with proof of intention to sepa-
rate; immigration courts repeatedly reject such claims based on a lack of proof. See id.; see 
also In re Ige, 20 I. & N. Dec. 880, 885 (B.I.A. 1994) (stating that “[t]he claim that the child 
will remain in the United States can easily be made for purposes of litigation, but most 
parents would not carry out such an alleged plan in reality”). 
47 In re Ige, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 886. 
48 See id.; Zug, supra note 45, at 218–19. Many challenges to deportation claim that the re-
sultant family separation violates the constitutional rights of the U.S. citizen children. See Zug, 
supra note 45, at 219–20. Those challenges, however, normally fail because courts assume that 
separation is a choice. See id. When separation cannot be considered a choice, then the pos-
sibility of a successful constitutional challenge increases greatly. See, e.g., id.; More Than 100 
Kids Sue Over Parents’ Deportations, USA Today ( June 17, 2009), http://www.usatoday.com/ 
news/nation/2009-06-17-deportation_N.htm (describing a constitutional challenge brought 
by 150 U.S. citizen children protesting their parents’ deportations). 
49 See Bartholet, supra note 12, at 85–86; Zug, supra note 45, at 218–20. 
50 See Newton v. INS, 736 F.2d 336, 343 (6th Cir. 1984); In re Ige, 20 I. & N. Dec. 880, 
886 (B.I.A. 1994); Zug, supra note 45, at 218–20. 
51 Compare Solangel Maldonado, When Father (or Mother) Doesn’t Know Best: Quasi-Parents 
and Parental Deference After Troxel v. Granville, 88 Iowa L. Rev. 865, 871 (2003) (arguing 
against the idea that parental rights are justified based on the parents’ greater likelihood 
of acting in their child’s best interest), with Emily Buss, Essay, “Parental” Rights, 88 Va. L. 
Rev. 635, 647 (2002) (“Parents’ strong emotional attachment to their children and consid-
erable knowledge of their particular needs make parents the child-specific experts most 
qualified to assess and pursue their children’s best interests in most circumstances. In con-
trast, the state’s knowledge of and commitment to any particular child is relatively thin.”). 
This weakness is shown by the prevalence of best interest arguments in courtrooms, child 
welfare administrations, and the legislature. See Maldonado, supra, at 871–72. 
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tal rights.52 This change, combined with the vulnerable position occu-
pied by minorities and undocumented immigrants, may explain the 
otherwise surprising receptivity with which a number of courts have 
received best interest arguments in undocumented immigrant parent 
termination cases.53 
A. The Child Welfare System 
 The importance of parental rights continues, but has begun to 
weaken, and this is particularly true in the context of the child welfare 
system.54 Traditionally, the emphasis on parental rights meant that fam-
ily preservation was the clear goal of the child welfare system.55 Conse-
quently, removing children to facilitate adoption was not considered a 
desirable option.56 
 Beginning in the 1990s, however, leading scholars—such as Eliza-
beth Bartholet, Richard Banks, and Richard Barth—began to voice 
their strong opposition to the traditional approach of the child welfare 
system.57 They argued that a child welfare system that ultimately aims to 
protect the rights of parents is one that neglects the rights and perhaps 
endangers the lives of children.58 Their work criticized the traditional 
                                                                                                                      
52 See In re D.T., 818 N.E.2d 1214, 1220 (Ill. 2004); In re B & J, 756 N.W.2d 234, 240–41 
(Mich. Ct. App. 2008); Bartholet, supra note 12, at 89–90. 
53 See In re D.T., 818 N.E.2d at 1220; In re B & J, 756 N.W.2d at 240–41; see, e.g., Bar-
tholet, supra note 12, at 89–90; Maldonado, supra note 51, at 871–72. 
54 See In re D.T., 818 N.E.2d at 1220; In re B & J, 756 N.W.2d at 240–41; see, e.g., Bar-
tholet, supra note 12, at 89–90; Maldonado, supra note 51, at 871–72. 
55 Bartholet, supra note 12, at 85–86 (“Family preservation has always been the domi-
nant modus operandi in the child welfare system.”). 
56 See id. at 86. Adoption was considered a last resort for exceptional situations, and 
was not perceived “as a normal and appropriate way to arrange for the care of children 
whose birth parents cannot or will not provide care.” See id. 
57 See id. at 84–86; Raymond C. O’Brien, An Analysis of Realistic Due Process Rights of Chil-
dren Versus Parents, 26 Conn. L. Rev. 1209, 1211–13, 1234–35, 1251–52 (1994). See generally 
Elizabeth Bartholet, Nobody’s Children: Abuse and Neglect, Foster Drift, and 
the Adoption Alternative (1999) (discussing the history of the child welfare system and 
how it does not take into account the best interest of the child); R. Richard Banks, The 
Color of Desire: Fulfilling Adoptive Parents’ Racial Preferences Through Discriminatory State Action, 
107 Yale L.J. 875 (1998) (stating that race preferences in adoption are harmful because 
they limit the likelihood of adoption and arguing for a strict non-accommodation policy 
that would prevent adoption agencies from facilitating these racial preferences); Richard 
P. Barth, Abusive and Neglecting Parents and the Care of Their Children, in All Our Families: 
New Policies for a New Century 217 (Mary Ann Mason et al. eds., 1998) (arguing for 
less emphasis on family preservation and more on children’s developmental needs, per-
manency, and adoption to meet those needs). 
58 See Bartholet, supra note 12, at 84–86; O’Brien, supra note 57, at 1211–13, 1251–52. 
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emphasis on family preservation and parental rights.59 Instead, they 
sought increased attention to the child’s best interest, which they fre-
quently argued was the permanency and stability that could only be 
achieved through adoption.60 
 This emerging Children’s Rights Movement succeeded in placing 
best interest considerations in the mind of the public.61 The final years 
of the twentieth century witnessed a dramatic reversal in attitudes re-
garding family preservation, adoption, and children’s rights.62 Adop-
tion, traditionally reserved for only the most exceptional circumstances, 
was increasingly viewed as the ultimate goal.63 This policy shift is exem-
plified in two significant Congressional acts—the Adoption and Safe 
Families Act (ASFA) and the Multiethnic Placement Act (MEPA)—a 
model law on adoption known as the Uniform Adoption Act (UAA), 
and a special immigration status for children called Special Immigra-
tion Juvenile (SIJ).64 All of these changes dramatically aided efforts to 
focus the child welfare system’s attention on the best interest of the 
child rather than family preservation.65 
B. The ASFA, MEPA, UAA, SIJ Status and the Triumph of Children’s Rights 
 Congress enacted the ASFA in response to the Adoption Assistance 
and Child Welfare Act (AACWA) and it represented a drastic shift in 
policy.66 Congress had previously passed the Adoption Assistance and 
                                                                                                                      
59 See Bartholet, supra note 12, at 84–86; O’Brien, supra note 57, at 1211–13, 1251–52. 
60 See Bartholet, supra note 12, at 84–87. Consequently, Bartholet has argued that, be-
cause of this lack of willingness to consider adoption, “[f]amily preservation has been 
regularly promoted and defended on the basis of a claim that the only alternative for chil-
dren is foster and institutional care.” Id. at 86. 
61 See Bartholet, supra note 12, at 84–85; Bartholet, supra note 14, at 897. 
62 See Bartholet, supra note 12, at 84–85; Bartholet, supra note 14, at 897. For example, 
new research in the 1990s called into doubt the benefit of Intensive Family Preservation 
Services (IFPS), programs that were popular in the 1970s and 1980s. See Bartholet, supra 
note 12, at 84. During the 1980s, many jurisdictions adopted the IFPS model of “family 
preservation.” See Bartholet, supra note 14, at 896. “The basic idea was to prevent children 
described as ‘at risk of placement’ from being removed from their parents and placed in 
foster care. Child abuse and neglect was conceived of as occurring because of a crisis in the 
family, which could be resolved by intensive but short-term supportive services.” Id. 
63 See Bartholet, supra note 12, at 84–85 (describing perceptions of adoption). 
64 8 C.F.R. § 204.11 (2010); Unif. Adoption Act (amended 1994), 9 U.L.A. 11 (2011). 
65 See Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (codi-
fied in scattered sections of 42. U.S.C. (2006)); Howard Metzenbaum Multiethnic Place-
ment Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-382, 108 Stat. 3518, 4056 (repealed); 8 C.F.R. § 204.11; 
Unif. Adoption Act, 9 U.L.A. 11; infra notes 72–113 and accompanying text. 
66 See 111 Stat. at 2115; Robert Mnookin & D. Kelly Weisberg, Child, Family, and 
State: Problems and Materials on Children and the Law 353 (6th ed. 2009). 
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Child Welfare Act in 1980.67 The primary objective of the AACWA was 
to help find permanent homes for children.68 The AACWA’s method 
for achieving this goal, however, was firmly rooted in the traditional 
ideas of family preservation.69 The AACWA sought to achieve perma-
nency by addressing the problems that could lead to removal and by 
aiding in the return of children to their families after they had been 
removed.70 By the 1990s, however, the benefits of family preservation 
were increasingly being questioned and the AACWA became subject to 
mounting criticism.71 
 The ASFA came as a response to these growing criticisms and one 
of its major reforms clarified the AACWA’s “reasonable efforts” stan-
dard.72 Under the AACWA, states were required to make reasonable 
efforts to prevent the removal of children from their homes and to re-
unify them with their families following removal.73 Although the 
AACWA did not specify the meaning of reasonable efforts, the ASFA 
expressed a clear statement that reunification is not possible or desir-
able in all cases.74 Another change was the ASFA’s strong approval of 
adoption.75 The ASFA promotes adoption by reducing the amount of 
                                                                                                                      
67 Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 944 Stat. 500 (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). The Community Partnership Move-
ment, another family preservation movement, also gained popularity during this period. 
Like IFPS, the goal of this movement was “to keep more children identified as at risk for 
maltreatment with their parents, and the idea again is that, with more supportive services 
for those parents, the children can be kept safe.” Bartholet, supra note 14, at 897. 
68 42 U.S.C. § 670; Bartholet, supra note 57, at 25. 
69 42 U.S.C. § 670; Bartholet, supra note 57, at 25–26. 
70 Mnookin & Weisberg, supra note 66, at 353. Congress facilitated this goal by provid-
ing states with federal matching funds for foster care and adoption services if states adopted 
certain standards. Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 670. Specifically, the Act requires that 
(1) [S]tates must formulate case plans (“permanency planning”) that are de-
signed to achieve placement in the least possible restrictive setting, (2) states 
must conduct periodic case reviews, and (3) states must make “reasonable ef-
forts” to prevent removal of children from the home and to reunify the family 
following removal . . . . Through these provisions Congress attempted to shift re-
sources from temporary out-of-home care and to focus on channeling resources 
either to a child’s natural family or to other permanent care alternatives. 
Mnookin & Weisberg, supra note 66, at 353. 
71 See Bartholet, supra note 57, at 26; Bartholet, supra note 12, at 84–86. 
72 Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (codified 
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); Mnookin & Weisberg, supra note 66, at 353. 
73 See Adoption and Safe Families Act § 101(a)(15)(D), 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D) 
(2006). 
74 Id. § 101(a)(15)(A); see Bartholet, supra note 12, at 85. 
75 See Adoption and Safe Families Act § 101(a)(15)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(C); 
Bartholet, supra note 12, at 85. 
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time a child spends in foster care while waiting to reunite with his or 
her parents.76 Under the ASFA, permanency hearings are now required 
no later than twelve months after a child enters foster care. Further-
more, states must seek termination of parental rights when children are 
in foster care for fifteen out of twenty-two consecutive months.77 Such 
changes demonstrated a shift away from parental rights and toward a 
greater emphasis on children’s rights.78 These changes highlighted the 
increasing importance of children’s rights and emphasized the position 
that a parent’s right to reunification should not come at the expense of 
a child’s right to stability and permanence.79 
 A second piece of legislation Congress passed during this period is 
the MEPA.80 Prior to the MEPA, many states had laws and policies dis-
couraging interracial adoptions and instead promoting same-race 
adoptions.81 State legislatures passed these laws after the National Asso-
ciation of Black Social Workers (NABSW) expressed strong opposition 
to the increasing incidence of white families adopting black children in 
the 1960s and ’70s.82 The NABSW described such adoptions as “a form 
of race and cultural genocide.”83 Transracial adoptions dramatically 
decreased as a result of this condemnation.84 
 After the NABSW’s condemnation, many states enacted race-
matching laws that required the consideration of a child’s race in adop-
tion placements and gave preference to families with the same racial or 
ethnic make-up.85 States without specific race-matching statutes often 
                                                                                                                      
76 See Adoption and Safe Families Act § 101(a)(15)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(C). 
77 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E). 
78 Bartholet, supra note 14, at 928 (describing the ASFA as a “good law because it shifts 
the balance in child welfare law and policy somewhat in the direction of valuing children’s 
rights more, and parents’ rights less”). 
79 See Bartholet, supra note 14, at 928. 
80 Howard Metzenbaum Multiethnic Placement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-382, 108 
Stat. 3518, 4056 (repealed). 
81 See Solangel Maldonado, Discouraging Racial Preferences in Adoptions, 39 U.C. Davis L. 
Rev. 1415, 1455 n.197 (2006) (noting that “Arizona, Nevada, and Missouri had race match-
ing policies that required that a child be available for adoption for a certain period of time 
. . . before he or she could be adopted by a family of a different race”). 
82 Maldonado, supra note 81, at 1454–55. 
83 Id. at 1455 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
84 Id. (“Although most African Americans disagreed with the NABSW’s views, transra-
cial adoptions decreased dramatically after its statement.”) (internal citations omitted). 
85 See id. at 1455 (citing David S. Rosettenstein, Trans-Racial Adoption and the Statutory 
Preference Schemes: Before the “Best Interests” and After the “Melting Pot,” 68 St. John’s L. Rev. 
137, 140 n.9 (noting that such informal policies in favor of race matching became part of 
department practice manuals)). 
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adopted informal race-matching policies.86 By the 1990s, however, chil-
dren’s rights advocates were increasingly concerned that, because the 
majority of adoptive parents were white while the majority of children 
awaiting adoption were not, many children in foster care were not be-
ing adopted as a result of their race.87 
 Congress passed MEPA in 1994 to reverse these race-matching 
policies.88 Like the ASFA, MEPA expressed Congress‘s clear approval of 
adoption and its desire to increase the number of adoptions of foster 
children.89 The goal of MEPA was to increase adoptions by ensuring 
that race would not be a controlling factor in adoption decisions.90 
Congress passed the law to make sure that children would not remain 
in foster care when there were families, regardless of race, willing to 
adopt them.91 Initially, MEPA did not meet much success because it 
permitted race to continue as a factor in placement decisions.92 State 
race-matching continued after MEPA’s enactment and, as a result, Con-
gress amended MEPA.93 
 The MEPA amendments prohibit federally funded agencies from 
“deny[ing] to any individual the opportunity to become an adoptive or 
a foster parent, on the basis of race, color, or national origin of the in-
dividual, or of the child, involved . . . .”94 After its amendment, MEPA 
expressly prohibited race-matching or any other consideration of race 
in placement decisions.95 Since the amendments’ passage, federal en-
forcement has become vigorous.96 The U.S. Department of Health and 
                                                                                                                      
86 See Maldonado, supra note 81, at 1455. 
87 See id. at 1455–56. 
88 Howard Metzenbaum Multiethnic Placement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-382, 108 
Stat. 3518, 4056 (repealed) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A § 5115a (West 1995)); See Bartholet, supra 
note 12, at 85 (stating that “[g]iven that the near-universal policy and practice throughout 
the nation had been for child welfare agencies to place children with same-race families if at 
all possible, this law was truly revolutionary in concept”). 
89 108 Stat. at 4056; see Maldonado, supra, note 81, at 1456. See generally Adoption and 
Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 42 U.S.C. (2006)). 
90 See 108 Stat. at 4056; Maldonado, supra, note 81, at 1456. 
91 See 108 Stat. at 4056; Maldonado, supra note 81, at 1455 (“Some African American 
children remained in foster care indefinitely, even though there were white families willing 
to adopt them.”). 
92 See Maldonado, supra note 81, at 1455–56. 
93 Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996 § 1808(c), Pub. L. No. 104-188, 110 Stat. 
1755, 1904 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1996(b)(1)(A)); see Maldonado, supra note 
81, at 1456–57. 
94 42 U.S.C. § 1996b(1)(A). 
95 42 U.S.C. § 1996b(1)(A) (2006); see Maldonado, supra note 81, at 1456–57. 
96 See Bartholet, supra note 14, at 928. 
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Human Services (DHHS) has imposed significant financial penalties 
upon a number of states for MEPA violations and has forced many 
more to modify placement practices.97 The DHHS has thus demon-
strated its strong commitment to enforcing MEPA.98 Its hope is that 
vigorous enforcement will finally achieve the goals of MEPA and in-
crease the adoptions of foster children.99 
 At the same time Congress was enacting MEPA and the ASFA, the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws pro-
posed the UAA.100 The UAA is a model act that pertains to custody de-
terminations after failed or thwarted adoptions.101 Under the UAA, af-
ter an adoption has failed, a court may conduct a hearing to consider 
whether to allow non-parents to obtain custody rather than return the 
child to his or her biological parents.102 Consequently, when an adop-
tion fails to occur—often because there is no finding of unfitness or be-
cause the parent does not consent—the biological parent is not auto-
matically entitled to regain custody of his or her child.103 Instead, the 
court considers the best interest of the child and makes a determination 
regarding with whom the child should be placed.104 In these cases, 
                                                                                                                      
 
97 Elizabeth Bartholet, Commentary, Cultural Stereotypes Can and Do Die: It’s Time to 
Move on with Transracial Adoption, 34 J. Am. Acad. Psychiatry & L. 315, 317–18 (2006). In 
2003, Ohio was issued a penalty letter imposing a $1.8 million fine. Id. In 2005, South 
Carolina received a penalty of $107,481. Id. at 317–19. 
98 See Child Welfare Policy Manual, U.S. Department Health & Hum. Services Admin. 
for Child. & Fam. ( Jul. 14, 2010), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/cwpm/programs/cb/laws_poli- 
cies/laws/cwpm/policy_dsp.jsp?citID=171; Information Memorandum Im-03-01, U.S. Depart-
ment Health & Hum. Services Admin. for Child. & Fam. (Mar. 25, 2003), http://www. 
acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/laws_policies/policy/im/2003/im0301.htm. 
99 See Maldonado, supra note 81, at 1458. In addition, the MEPA’s enactment has also in-
fluenced private agencies, which are increasingly willing to place children trans-racially. See id. 
(noting that “the majority of public agencies currently place children trans-racially, and most 
private agencies, although not bound by MEPA, frequently place African American children 
with white families”). 
100 Unif. Adoption Act (amended 1994), 9 U.L.A. 11 (2011). 
101 See id. 
102 Id. Only Vermont has adopted the UAA. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15A, §§ 1-101–8-101 
(2011). A number of states, however, have also enacted similar statutes. See, e.g., 750 Ill. 
Comp. Stat. 50/20 (1999) (requiring a court to “promptly conduct a hearing as to the 
temporary and permanent custody of the minor child who is the subject of the proceed-
ings” after an adoption petition has been denied or vacated). 
103 See Unif. Adoption Act § 2-408 cmt. at 62 (amended 1994), 9 U.L.A. 60 (2011) 
(stating that a court’s conclusion that a parent is not unfit or does not consent to the 
child’s adoption “is not tantamount to a determination that the child must be placed in 
that parent’s custody”). 
104 Appell, supra note 35, at 728 n.191 (explaining that the UAA provides for a “deter-
mination whether return to the mother would be detrimental to the child when the 
2012] Separation, Deportation, Termination 79 
courts redefine the term parent to include thwarted adoptive parents, 
and thus, analyze these cases as a custody dispute.105 As a result, courts 
are able to avoid the parental rights doctrine and apply the best interest 
of the child standard.106 Like the ASFA and the MEPA, the UAA evinces 
a strong preference for adoption and a disinclination for reunification 
and parental rights.107 Under the UAA, once a child is removed, he or 
she is potentially adoptable, regardless of parental consent or fitness.108 
 The effect of such acts, particularly MEPA and the ASFA, cannot 
be understated.109 Although the majority of children (approximately 
57%) still exit foster care through reunification, the rates of reunifica-
tion have declined dramatically.110 Children who entered the foster 
care system in 1997, the year the ASFA was passed, “had a 13% slower 
rate to reunification than those who entered in 1990.”111 In addition, 
during this period, the number of children adopted from foster care 
increased substantially.112 Since the enactment of the ASFA, the major-
ity of states have doubled the number of children adopted out of foster 
care and, in some states, that number has tripled.113 
C. Children’s Rights and Immigration Law 
 The increasing focus on children’s rights also had an influence on 
immigration law.114 In 1990, Congress changed immigration law to cre-
ate the SIJ nonimmigrant legal status category.115 Congress created the 
SIJ status to ensure that undocumented children who were victims of 
                                                                                                                      
mother revokes her adoption consent after a failed attempt to have the father’s rights ter-
minated and an adoption decree entered”). 
105 Naomi R. Cahn, Reframing Child Custody Decisionmaking, 58 Ohio St. L.J. 1, 21–22 
(1997) (noting that in these situations, courts transform a “potential adoption case be-
tween the biological parent and third parties into a custody case where the dispute is be-
tween the parents”). 
106 See id. 
107 See Appell, supra note 35, at 728–29. 
108 See id. 
109 See Bartholet, supra note 12, at 83–90. But see Bartholet, supra note 14, at 871 (arguing 
that the disproportionality movement, which seeks to reduce the disproportionate number of 
African-American children in foster care, may indicate the beginnings of a swing back in the 
direction of family preservation). 
110 Mnookin & Weisberg, supra note 66, at 332. 
111 Id. at 333. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)( J) (2006); 8 C.F.R. § 204.11 (2010); My Xuan T. Mai, Note, 
Children Under the Radar: The Unique Plight of Immigrant Juveniles, 12 Barry L. Rev. 241, 244 
(2009). 
115 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)( J); 8 C.F.R. § 204.11. 
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abuse and neglect would be permitted to remain and receive care in 
the United States.116 Congress’s goal was to protect the best interests of 
these vulnerable children.117 Under the SIJ provision, once a child is 
removed from parental care, declared dependent on a juvenile court, 
and eligible for foster care, the child becomes eligible for legal status 
adjustment as a SIJ.118 These children may then take steps to become 
lawful permanent residents.119 State regulations encourage caseworkers 
to identify these children and assist them in petitioning for lawful per-
manent resident status, which may eventually lead to citizenship.120 
 The ASFA, MEPA, UAA, and SIJ status provisions were a clear re-
sponse to the growing influence of the Children’s Rights Movement in 
                                                                                                                      
116 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)( J); 8 C.F.R. § 204.11; see also Mai, supra note 114, at 244. 
SIJ status functions as such: 
SIJ status involves a finding by the Family Court in the jurisdiction where the 
child lives that the child is dependent upon the family court, usually made in 
guardianship or foster care proceedings, and then an application to U.S. Citi-
zenship and Immigration Services . . . or made in open court where the child 
is in removal proceedings. If granted, SIJ status results in adjustment to Law-
ful Permanent Resident status. 
Jennifer L. Coyler et al., The Representational and Counseling Needs of the Immigrant Poor, 78 
Fordham L. Rev. 461, 470 n.34 (2009). 
117 See Mai, supra note 114, at 244. Part of the impetus for creating this category was 
the concern that undocumented children were not being removed from abusive and ne-
glectful homes out of fear that removal would lead to deportation. See id. (“Similar to the 
Violence Against Women Act . . . , which provides aid to victims of domestic abuse, the SIJ 
statute was Congress’ answer to a moral crisis involving undocumented children suffering 
neglect, abuse, or abandonment at the hands of those closest to them—their family.”) 
(internal citations omitted). One of the problems with the original act, however, was its 
lack of clarity on whether it applied to children who had entered the country illegally. See 
Gao v. Jenifer, 185 F.3d 548, 552 (6th Cir. 1999). The technical amendments to section 245 
of the Immigration and Nationality Act rectified these problems. See Miscellaneous and 
Technical Immigration Naturalization Amendments of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102–232, 105 
Stat. 1733, 1744 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1255); 8 C.F.R. § 204.11. Subsection 
245(h) of the Act permits adjustment of status regardless of the minor’s original mode of 
entry into the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1255(h). 
118 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)( J); 8 C.F.R. § 204.11. 
119 See Memorandum from Erwin McEwen, Director of the Department of Children and 
Family Services, to DCFS and POS Child Welfare Staff Rules and Procedures Bookholders 
(May 16, 2008), available at http://www.f2f.ca.gov/res/pdf/PolicyGuideImmigration.pdf. 
120 See, e.g., id. (describing the requirement of DCFS workers to determine a child’s 
citizenship “status and explain[] the benefits and services that may be unavailable to a 
child who does not become a legal permanent resident of the United States”); see also Ce-
cilia Saco, An Overview of Immigration Issues and Child Welfare from a Social Worker’s Perspective, 
Department of Child. & Fam. Services (L.A. County) (Dec. 12, 2007), http://www. 
f2f.ca.gov/res/pdf/BeyondTheBench.pdf (describing the work of the Special Immigrant 
Status Unit, which files the SIJ status applications for undocumented children; and noting 
that since 2006, the Unit had filed over 2400 applications for green cards). 
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that they all place the needs and rights of children above those of par-
ents.121 In short, they reflect the Children’s Rights Movement’s belief 
that the child’s best interest is of paramount importance.122 In addi-
tion, the influence of the Children’s Rights Movement continues to 
grow and is clearly reflected in undocumented immigrant parent ter-
mination cases.123 The Children’s Rights Movement paved the way for 
the use and acceptance of arguments favoring a child’s best interest.124 
And such arguments are now being used to justify the removal of chil-
dren from fit, undocumented immigrant parents.125 The following un-
documented immigrant cases reveal that courts and social workers are 
willing to ignore parental rights and consider the best interest of the 
child above all else. 
                                                                                                                     
III. Immigrant Termination Cases 
 Immigrant termination cases lie at the intersection of changing 
law and policy. Although the law traditionally protected parental rights 
and sought to ensure family integrity, children’s rights have gained in-
creasing importance along with the belief that such rights include the 
right to be with good, and not simply fit, parents.126 These changing 
beliefs are exemplified in undocumented immigrant parent termina-
tion cases, where such arguments are often accepted. In these termina-
tion cases, courts commonly acknowledge the traditional rule that a 
parent must be deemed unfit before termination is appropriate, but 
 
121 See Mai, supra note 114, at 246; supra notes 66–113 and accompanying text. 
122 See Mai, supra note 114, at 246; supra notes 66–113 and accompanying text. These 
acts have garnered significant academic support. See, e.g., Signithia Fordham, Racelessness as 
a Factor in Black Students’ School Success: Pragmatic Strategy or Pyrrhic Victory?, 58 Harv. Educ. 
Rev. 54, 79–80 (1988) (discussing empirical research concluding that trans-racial adoption 
yields academic advantages for black children); Kim Forde-Mazrui, Note, Black Identity and 
Child Placement: The Best Interests of Black and Biracial Children, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 925, 954 
(1994) (“[A] white parent’s denial of Black inferiority may be more believable because it is 
less self-serving.”). 
123 See, e.g., Anita C. v. Superior Court, No. B213283, 2009 WL 2859068, at *9 (Cal. Ct. 
App. Sept. 8, 2009); In re B & J, 756 N.W.2d at 240. 
124 See, e.g., Anita C., 2009 WL 2859068, at *9; In re B & J, 756 N.W.2d at 240. 
125 See, e.g., In re M.M., 587 S.E.2d 825, 832–33 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003); In re B & J, 756 
N.W.2d at 240. 
126 See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 72–75 (2000); Willis v. State, 888 N.E.2d 177, 184 
(Ind. 2008) (implicitly refuting the position that parents who use corporal punishment are 
unfit); Annette R. Appell, “Bad” Mothers and Spanish-Speaking Caregivers, 7 Nev. L.J. 759, 761 
(2007); Teresa W. Julian et al., Cultural Variations in Parenting: Perceptions of Caucasian, African-
American, Hispanic, and Asian-American Parents, 43 Fam. Rel. 30, 32 (1994). 
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then terminate parental rights based on a finding that termination is in 
the child’s best interest, irrespective of parental fitness.127 
A. Fitness and Initial Removal 
 In undocumented immigrant termination cases, courts and wel-
fare agencies frequently conclude that a parent’s undocumented status 
alone demonstrates unfitness.128 These conclusions reveal a primary 
concern with best interest considerations, as opposed to parental rights, 
and an assumption that living with undocumented parents is not in a 
child’s best interest.129 In these cases, the presumption of unfitness is 
often apparent from the first removal decisions.130 Many of these cases 
begin with questionable charges of abuse and neglect.131 Accusations by 
third parties, often those who want the child for themselves, are rou-
tinely given significant consideration.132 Most tellingly, perhaps, is that 
lower courts in a handful of cases considered a parent’s lack of English 
proficiency a sufficient reason to remove a child.133 
                                                                                                                      
127 See, e.g., In re B & J, 756 N.W.2d 234, 239–40 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008) (reversing a 
Michigan family court’s termination of parental rights for erroneously construing the 
children’s best interests and holding them as a paramount concern). 
128 See In re M.M., 587 S.E.2d 825, 832 (Ga. Ct. App 2003) (commenting on a juvenile 
court’s termination of parental rights based on immigrant status). In other cases, courts 
simply ignore the requirement that they make a fitness inquiry and move immediately to 
considerations of the child’s best interest. See, e.g., Anita C. v. Superior Court, No. B213283, 
2009 WL 2859068, at * 5(Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 8, 2009) (finding unfitness irrelevant because 
“return of [the child] to [the] mother would be detrimental to him”). 
129 See Anita C., 2009 WL 2859068 at *5; In re M.M., 587 S.E.2d at 832. 
130 See, e.g., In re M.M., 587 S.E.2d at 832. 
131 See, e.g., In re M.M., 587 S.E.2d at 827. 
132 See Vivi Abrams, Fuller Says DHR Workers Removed Baby, Birmingham News, Oct. 25, 
2003, at 13A (reporting that undocumented immigrant Marta Alonzo’s son was placed in 
state care by two “community volunteers” who literally took the child from his family); Shaila 
Dewan, Two Families, Two Cultures and the Girl Between Them, N.Y. Times, May 12, 2005, at A16 
(noting that the child’s teacher accused the immigrant mother of being unfit and then re-
ceived custody of the child); Omar Riojas, DLA Piper, Counsel for Encarnación Bail Romero, 
Address at The Impact of Immigration Policy on Children (Nov. 5, 2009) (describing how an 
undocumented mother lost custody of her child after a local teacher’s aide offered babysit-
ting services and then refused to return the child) (remarks on file with author). 
133 See Tim Padgett & Dolly Mascareñas, Can a Mother Lose Her Child Because She Doesn’t 
Speak English?, TIME (Aug. 27, 2009), available at http://www.time.com/time/nation/ 
article/0,8599,1918941,00.html. English proficiency is not a requirement for custody. See 
Zuniga v. Ponce, No. 1 CA-CV 08-0615, 2009 WL 4251630, at *4 (Ariz. Ct. App. Nov. 27, 
2009) (“There is no requirement for a parent to speak English in order to have custody of 
his or her child.”). Consequently, it should comes as no surprise that the majority of these 
decisions have been overturned on appeal. See, e.g., In re B & J, 756 N.W.2d at 237; In re 
Angelica L., 767 N.W.2d 74, 80 (Neb. 2009); infra notes 255–266 and accompanying text. 
However, the likelihood of appeal in undocumented immigrant termination cases is low. 
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 For example, the Mississippi Department of Human Services inves-
tigated an undocumented immigrant mother, Cirila Baltazar Cruz, after 
she gave birth to her daughter.134 The Department immediately re-
moved the child, finding that Cruz’s lack of English proficiency “placed 
her unborn child in danger and will place the baby in danger in the fu-
ture.”135 In a similar instance in Tennessee, the teacher of an immigrant 
mother’s child accused the mother of neglect and urged officials to re-
move the child.136 On review, a Tennessee court agreed, basing its deci-
sion on the mother’s lack of English proficiency.137 The court then pro-
hibited contact with the daughter until the mother demonstrated her 
“commitment to her daughter” by learning to speak English.138 Finally, 
in South Carolina, state authorities removed a child from her undocu-
mented parents because the police mistook their indigenous dialect for 
slurred Spanish and charged them with public intoxication.139 
B. Judicial Unfitness Determinations at the Juvenile Court Level 
 Undocumented immigrant parental rights termination decisions 
mirror the presumptions underlying the initial removals.140 These deci-
sions are often based on nothing more than a parent’s immigration 
status and again reveal a primary concern for the best interest of the 
child rather than parental rights.141 For example, in In re Angelica L., the 
state of Nebraska removed an undocumented immigrant mother’s chil-
dren after receiving allegations of neglect.142 The mother, a native of 
Guatemala named Maria Luis, entered the United States without proper 
                                                                                                                      
134 See Padgett & Mascareñas, supra note 133. 
135 Id. 
136 Dewan, supra note 132. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. In fact, the court made no accommodations for the mother’s lack of English profi-
ciency. The mother, Felipa, spoke only an indigenous dialect called Mixtecan, but no Mix-
tecan translators were provided during the initial custody hearing. Id. Consequently, the 
mother could not defend herself against the charges of neglect. See id. When later asked how 
learning English would make Filipa a better mother, the judge replied, “It’s common sense.” 
Id. Though this case did not involve an undocumented immigrant, it nonetheless demon-
strates that the acceptability of these biases is growing. 
139 Interview with Patricia Ravenhorst, Exec. Dir., S.C. Immigrant Victim’s Network (Oct. 
22, 2009). The child’s babysitter, a woman who openly acknowledged her desire to gain cus-
tody of Martin and Lucia’s daughter, provided the initial information regarding the parents’ 
intoxication to the police. Id. Immediately after the couple’s child entered into state custody, 
the babysitter requested custody of the child. Id. 
140 See In re V.S., 548 S.E.2d 490, 492–93 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001); In re Angelica L., 767 
N.W.2d at 80. 
141 See In re V.S., 548 S.E.2d at 492–93; In re Angelica L., 767 N.W.2d at 80. 
142 In re Angelica L., 767 N.W.2d at 81–82. 
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documentation in 1997.143 Her son Daniel was born in 1998 and her 
daughter Angelica was born in 2004.144 Angelica was born prematurely 
and, when she was one month old, her mother took her to the hospital 
where she was diagnosed as “suffering from dehydration, malnutrition, a 
urinary tract infection, and a left pulmonary branch stenosis.”145 
 After Angelica’s illness, Luis recognized she needed guidance and 
sought the assistance of Healthy Starts, a federal and state funded social 
services program that provides parents with child care information and 
assistance.146 After Luis became involved in the Healthy Starts program, 
they sent reports to Nebraska DHHS expressing concern for the well 
being of Daniel and Angelica.147 The department investigated the re-
ports and determined them unfounded.148 When Angelica next be-
came ill, an employee from Healthy Starts once again contacted DHHS 
alleging abuse.149 DHHS again determined the claim to be unfounded, 
but the report nevertheless triggered an investigation and, as a result of 
this investigation, DHHS determined Luis to be unfit.150 
 The juvenile court held that the state had proved her unfitness 
based on the fact that she “either A) embarked on an unauthorized trip 
to the United States with a newborn premature infant or B) gave birth 
to a premature infant in the United States” after entering the country 
illegally.151 Without deciding between the two, the trial court held that 
either scenario demonstrated “that [Luis] did not provide the basic 
level of prenatal and postnatal care.”152 According to the trial court, 
                                                                                                                      
143 Id. at 80. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. at 80–81. At the hospital, the doctor became aware of Maria’s immigration status 
and threatened to recommend deportation if Maria did not follow her instructions or 
follow up on Angelica’s medical care. Id. at 81. 
146 Id. at 81. 
147 In re Angelica L., 767 N.W.2d at 81. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. 
150 See id. at 81–82 (noting that these “allegations [of abuse] were never substantiated and 
were deemed to be unfounded”). Although the allegations were unfounded, the Nebraska 
DHHS removed the children after police arrested Maria for obstructing a government inves-
tigation. Id. at 82. They charged Maria with misidentifying herself as the children’s babysit-
ter—rather than their mother—when the child welfare workers came to investigate the alle-
gations of abuse. Id. at 81–82. After her obstruction arrest, Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE) officials took Maria into custody and scheduled her for deportation. Id. 
at 82. 
151 Id. at 87–88 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
152 In re Angelica L., 767 N.W.2d at 88 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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good mothers do not illegally cross the border if they are pregnant or 
have just given birth.153 
 Other courts use similar immigration violations to justify findings 
of unfitness.154 In In re V.S., the Georgia Department of Family and 
Children Services (DFCS) removed the daughter of an undocumented 
father shortly after birth when both she and her mother tested positive 
for cocaine.155 The mother was addicted to drugs but the undocu-
mented father never used drugs and had attempted to prevent the 
mother’s drug use during pregnancy.156 After the Georgia DFCS took 
custody of V.S., the father tried to visit but DFCS employees claimed 
that he needed an appointment and turned him away.157 He had called 
repeatedly to set up appointments and, though DFCS had his name 
and contact information, the Department did not contact him or re-
turn his calls.158 Only months later did DFCS permit him to see his 
daughter for one hour every fifteen days.159 He kept each of his ap-
pointments, showed affection, and “seemed to genuinely love V.S.”160 
Nevertheless, the juvenile court deemed him unfit, in part because he 
“is an illegal alien and is subject to deportation.”161 
 Other cases are comparable.162 In In re M.M., a Georgia juvenile 
court found a father unfit and terminated his parental rights essentially 
due to his status as an undocumented immigrant and its concern about 
the “possibility that the father could someday be deported.”163 In addi-
tion, the juvenile court terminated the mother’s rights based in part on 
her relationship with a man “who was an illegal alien.”164 Finally, in In re 
                                                                                                                      
153 See id. at 87–88. 
154 See In re V.S., 548 S.E.2d at 492–93. 
155 Id. at 492. He asked to pay child support but was told he would not be allowed to do 
so until a court hearing. Id. Georgia DFCS never created a reunification plan for the fa-
ther. Id. When V.S. was 7 months old, the state petitioned to terminate both the mother 
and father’s parental rights. Id. at 493. 
156 Id. at 492. The relationship began as one for money but turned into a romantic re-
lationship. Id. The father and mother moved in together and the mother became preg-
nant. Id. The father gave her money for prenatal care and asked her to marry him. Id. She 
refused. Id. The father eventually moved out. Id. 
157 Id. 
158 Id. 
159 In re V.S., 548 S.E.2d at 492. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. at 493. 
162 See In re M.M., 587 S.E.2d at 829, 831–32; In re B & J, 756 N.W.2d at 238. 
163 In re M.M., 587 S.E.2d at 832. In this case, the father was an undocumented immi-
grant but not in deportation proceedings. See id. at 831. Nevertheless, the court clearly had 
a “problem with [the father’s] INS situation.” Id. 
164 Id. at 829. 
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B & J, a Michigan family court found two parents unfit, stating that 
they had been deported and thus “were unable to provide proper care 
and custody for the children.”165 
 Under the law, a parent’s undocumented status, by itself, is not 
enough to support an unfitness determination.166 The above cases, 
however, demonstrate that such terminations occur nonetheless.167 
These decisions indicate that in undocumented immigrant parental 
rights terminations cases, trial courts are discarding the parental rights 
standard and employing a best interest of the child standard instead. 
IV. Immigrant Parents’ Post-Deportation Circumstances 
 Given the state of the law, which maintains that parents must be 
found unfit before termination is appropriate, a finding of unfitness 
based on immigration status alone is inappropriate.168 Nevertheless, 
some courts based their fitness determinations of immigrant status on 
what they believe is the best interest of the child.169 The choice to ele-
vate best interest considerations over parental rights explains the lack 
of sympathy courts and agencies demonstrate for the parents’ post-
deportation circumstances. It also helps explain why courts and agen-
cies believe that even outright interference with these parents’ attempts 
at achieving reunification is justified. 
A. No Consideration of Deportee’s Post-Deportation Circumstances 
 Courts are tremendously unwilling to consider difficulties that an 
undocumented or deported parent might experience when trying to 
comply with the requirements of a reunification plan.170 For example, 
Anita C. v. Superior Court—where a mother unsuccessfully attempted to 
take parenting classes after being deported to Guatemala—demon-
strates one court’s lack of sympathy for the difficulties that undocu-
mented immigrant parents encounter when trying to comply with re-
                                                                                                                      
165 In re B & J, 756 N.W.2d at 238. 
166 See In re V.S., 548 S.E.2d at 493–94. 
167 See In re M.M., 587 S.E.2d at 829, 831–32; In re B & J, 756 N.W.2d at 238. Although 
some of these terminations are reversed on appeal, most such cases never get appealed. 
See, e.g., In re B & J, 756 N.W.2d at 237; In re Angelica L., 767 N.W.2d at 80; infra notes 251–
266 and accompanying text. 
168 See In re V.S., 548 S.E.2d 490, 493–94 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001). 
169 See Anita C. v. Superior Court, No. B213283, 2009 WL 2859068, at *8–9 (Cal. Ct. 
App. Sept. 8, 2009). 
170 See id. 
2012] Separation, Deportation, Termination 87 
unification plans in a foreign country.171 This lack of sympathy shows 
that the primary concern of the court is achieving what it perceives as 
the child’s best interest.172 
 Similarly, in In re Angelica L., a Nebraska juvenile court held that 
the mother’s “fear of deportation serves as no excuse for her failure to 
provide the minimum level of health care to her children.”173 It simi-
larly found that her undocumented status did not excuse her failure to 
remedy the conditions that led to the initial finding of unfitness.174 Ac-
cording to the court, “[b]eing in the status of an undocumented immi-
grant is, no doubt, fraught with peril and this [inability to satisfy the 
reunification plan] would appear to be an example of that fact.”175 
 In Anita C. v. Superior Court, the court held that the lack of re-
sources available to the deported mother in her home country did not 
excuse her inability to comply with her reunification plan, which re-
quired her to take specific parenting classes.176 The California Court of 
Appeal dismissed the mother’s explanation that the required classes 
were not taught in Guatemala.177 It affirmed the juvenile court’s recog-
nition that the mother’s ability to comply with the reunification plan 
was limited by the resources available to her but blamed her for this 
situation, stating that “we may also consider that mother [through de-
portation] placed herself out of reach of many of the services . . . [the 
state] could have provided.”178 Consequently, the Court of Appeal held 
that “due to [these] circumstances, mother could not adequately ad-
dress the issues that led to her losing custody of the children,” and 
                                                                                                                      
171 See id. 
172 See id. at *9. 
173 In re Angelica L., 767 N.W.2d. 74, 88 (Neb. 2009) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). 
174 See id. 
175 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
176 See Anita C., 2009 WL 2859068, at *2, *8. In Anita C., child welfare officials removed 
the child, J.A., from his home after Anita left him unattended while at work. Id. at * 1. The 
state later charged her with, and she pled guilty to, child endangerment. Id. ICE officials 
then deported her. Id. The case initially concerned three older half siblings, but the court 
terminated jurisdiction over their cases when they returned to their father’s custody. Id. at 
*2 n.5. 
177 Id. at *8. 
178 Id. at *7. The court also blamed the mother for the failure of the international 
home study to be completed. Id. During the time the home study was to have been con-
ducted the mother attempted to illegally re-enter the United States, presumably in a des-
perate attempt to reunify with her child. See id. at *4. 
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agreed with the juvenile court, that this is simply “a sad consequence of 
illegal immigration.”179 
B. Deportation as Abandonment 
 In other cases, the courts’ lack of sympathy for the difficulties faced 
by undocumented immigrant parents manifests as a willingness to treat 
their deportation as abandonment.180 Perez-Velasquez v. Culpeper County 
Department of Social Services involved an undocumented immigrant 
mother and father with three young, U.S. citizen children.181 The state 
took custody of the children after a social worker visited the home and 
found the mother had left them unsupervised when she went for a job 
interview.182 The father was incarcerated at the time his children were 
taken into custody and he was deported immediately after his release 
from prison.183 Shortly thereafter, a Virginia court terminated both par-
ents’ parental rights and the children became eligible for adoption.184 
 With regard to the father, the court found him unfit because he 
had, “without good cause, failed to maintain continuing contact with 
and to provide or substantially plan for the future of the [children] for 
a period of six months after the child’s placement in foster care . . . .”185 
The father challenged the decision, arguing that his failure to maintain 
contact with his children was because of his incarceration and deporta-
tion, and consequently, was not willful.186 The court found this expla-
nation irrelevant, however, stating that it was the “father’s own actions 
                                                                                                                      
179 Id. at *5, *8; see also E-mail from Hilda Lopez, Attorney, to author (Apr. 5, 2010) (on 
file with author) (describing an unpublished case from Massachusetts in which a juvenile 
court held that, because the deported mother could not come to the United States to re-
gain custody, the state Department of Children and Family Services had no responsibility 
to make reasonable efforts at reunification). 
180 See Perez-Velasquez v. Culpeper Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., No. 0360-09-4, 2009 WL 
1851017, at *2 (Va. Ct. App. June 30, 2009). 
181 Id. at *1. See also In re M.A.P.A., No. 98-1218, 1999 WL 711447, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. 
July 23, 1999) (finding termination of an undocumented immigrant father’s parental 
rights justified based on the fact that he was in prison and, once released, would be likely 
be deported and not “have sufficient time to develop a relationship with” his son). 
182 Perez-Velasquez, 2009 WL 1851017, at *1. 
183 Id. 
184 Id. at *1, *3. 
185 Id. at *2 n.1, *3. The father admitted he had no contact with his children during 
this period but argued that child welfare services never told him where the children were 
and that such contact would have been difficult because the children spoke English and he 
spoke primarily Mam and Spanish. Id. at *2. 
186 Id. 
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[that] led to this situation.”187 In addition, the court was horrified by 
the father’s reunification plan, which was to return to the United States 
illegally and take the children back with him.188 
 Similarly, in the case of Encarnación Bail Romero, a Missouri cir-
cuit court found that Bail Romero, an undocumented immigrant 
mother incarcerated after providing false identification papers during 
an Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) workplace raid, had 
abandoned her son.189 Although Bail Romero’s separation from her 
son was involuntary, the trial court still held that her actions constituted 
abandonment.190 Finally, in In re V.S., a Georgia juvenile court used the 
difficulties the undocumented father encountered when trying to visit 
his daughter as grounds for abandonment.191 The court held that the 
father “has failed for more than one year to develop and maintain a 
parental bond with the child; he has not provided any financial support 
to the child [and] he only began visiting the child when she was nine 
months old.”192 These statements, however, directly contradict the facts 
                                                                                                                      
 
187 See Perez-Velasquez, 2009 WL 1851017, at *2. Although the court noted that incar-
ceration by itself does not justify termination of parental rights, the court held that termi-
nation is permissible when incarceration is “combined with other evidence concerning the 
parent/child relationship.” Id. Other evidence included the father’s immigration status. 
See id. As noted by the trial court and upheld on appeal, the father’s deportation 
eliminated any chance that he could maintain contact with the children and 
be involved in the foster care plan during the time period after the children’s 
placement in foster care, or that he could participate in remedying, within a 
reasonable time, the conditions resulting in the placement and continuation 
of the children in foster care. 
Id. 
188 See id. As a convicted felon, any return to the United States would have been illegal; 
thus, the court found “[t]his plan was not viable, and it was not in the best interests of the 
children.” See id. 
189 In re C.M.B.R., 332 S.W.3d 793, 801–02, 804 (Mo. 2011) (en banc). Although offi-
cials released other parents, Bail Romero was ineligible for release because she had used 
false identification. Thompson, supra note 10. “Such charges were part of a crackdown by 
the Bush administration, which punished illegal immigrants by forcing them to serve out 
sentences before being deported.” Id. After Bail Romero’s conviction, the Supreme Court 
in Flores-Figueroa v. United States, struck down a conviction under a law criminalizing aggra-
vated identity theft. See 129 S. Ct. 1886, 1894 (2009). According to the Supreme Court, 
there must be intent and, consequently, this means that Bail Romero’s separation from her 
child was unnecessary and unjustified. See id.; In re C.M.B.R., 332 S.W.3d at 804. 
190 In re C.M.B.R., 332 S.W.3d at 816–18. 
191 See In re V.S., 548 S.E.2d at 493. 
192 Id. The juvenile court also provided additional reasons such as 
he failed to contact DFCS and went to Mexico without notifying anyone con-
nected with this proceeding; he failed to respond to a certified letter from 
DFCS; he got the child’s mother pregnant knowing she had a drug problem; 
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of the case, which demonstrate that he had bonded with his child, at-
tempted to pay child support, and actively sought visitation since her 
birth.193 
C. Immigration Law 
 A court’s ability to ignore an immigrant parent’s post-deportation 
circumstances or view deportation as abandonment is reinforced by the 
harsh immigration laws on illegal reentry.194 In 1996, Congress sought 
to reduce the incidence of illegal immigration and passed the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA).195 
One of the consequences of IIRIRA was increased penalties for illegal 
reentry after deportation.196 In the context of immigrant parent termi-
nations, this means that once a parent is deported, he or she is barred 
from returning to contest termination.197 An undocumented parent 
who attempts illegal reentry risks arrest and his or her reasons for reen-
try receive no consideration.198 As a result, deported parents can rarely 
                                                                                                                      
he did nothing to stop the mother from abusing drugs; he has failed to ob-
tain permanent employment with benefits; he has failed to obtain basic child 
care items, such as a car seat; and he does not have his own place to live. 
Id. 
193 See id. at 492–93 (“In this case, the evidence shows that the father made numerous 
attempts to contact DFCS in order to visit his daughter, asked if he could pay child sup-
port, gave the child’s mother money for prenatal care, arranged for and kept his visitation 
appointments for the five-month period preceding the hearing, showed love and affection 
toward V.S. during visitation, and made arrangements for caring for the child should he be 
given custody.”). 
194 See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 § 334, 
Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-548, 3009-635 (1996). 
195 110 Stat. at 3009-635; see Perez-Velasquez, 2009 WL 1851017, at *3; Statement on Sign-
ing the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, 2 Pub. Papers 1729, 1731 (Sept. 
30, 1996) (“[The bill] also includes landmark immigration reform legislation that builds 
on our progress of the last 3 years. It strengthens the rule of law by cracking down on ille-
gal immigration at the border, in the workplace, and in the criminal justice system—
without punishing those living in the United States legally.”). 
196 See 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (2006); 110 Stat. at 3009-635. 
197 See United States v. Hernandez-Baide, 392 F.3d 1153, 1158 (10th Cir. 2004), rev’d on 
other grounds, 544 U.S. 1015 (2005). 
198 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), (b)(2) (making reentry by a deported felon illegal); see Hernan-
dez-Baide, 392 F.3d at 1158. Obviously not all deported parents have felony convictions, but 
after the new, stricter immigration controls, more undocumented immigrants are facing 
criminal charges and incarceration before deportation. See, e.g., United States v. Saucedo-
Patino, 358 F.3d 790, 791 (11th Cir. 2004); United States v. Dyck, 334 F.3d 736, 737 (8th 
Cir. 2003); United States v. Carrasco, 313 F.3d 750, 753 (2d Cir. 2002). 
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return, thereby increasing the ability of courts to treat deportation as 
abandonment.199 
 The case of United States v. Hernandez-Baide is illustrative.200 Officials 
arrested Arlette Hernadez-Baide, a deported immigrant mother, for 
criminal reentry when she returned to the United States to contest the 
termination of her parental rights and the subsequent adoption of her 
daughter.201 A district court judge sentenced her “to twenty-four months 
imprisonment followed by three years [of] supervised release.”202 She 
challenged the sentence, arguing that the court should have applied a 
downward departure—a sentence below the statutory minimum—based 
on mitigating circumstances concerning a lesser harm.203 Specifically, 
on appeal to the Tenth Circuit, she argued that the district court should 
have considered the fact that she returned to the United States only to 
prevent termination of her parental rights and the adoption of her 
daughter.204 The district court, however, denied her request for a down-
ward departure and the Tenth Circuit affirmed.205 The appeals court 
explained that Congress intended to make reentry a strict liability 
crime, and thus, a deported alien who makes an unauthorized reentry is 
“‘strictly liable’ for such criminal conduct, regardless of the underlying 
motivation for such illegal entry.”206 
 This conclusion has been consistently upheld.207 A parent attempt-
ing illegal reentry to contest termination of parental rights is entitled to 
                                                                                                                      
 
199 See, e.g., Saucedo-Patino, 358 F.3d at 794–95; Dyck, 334 F.3d at 741–42; Carrasco, 313 
F.3d at 755–56; Anita C., 2009 WL 2859068, at *8 (deported mother attempted illegal reen-
try to contest termination of her parental rights and adoption of her child). 
200 392 F.3d at 1155, 1158; see also Saucedo-Patino, 358 F.3d at 794–95; Dyck, 334 F.3d at 
741–42; Carrasco, 313 F.3d at 755–56; Anita C., 2009 WL 2859068, at *4, *8. 
201 Hernandez-Baide, 392 F.3d at 1154–55. 
202 Id. at 1155. 
203 Id.; see infra note 207 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of United States 
v. Booker). 
204 Id. 
205 Id. at 1156. On appeal, the government argued that a lesser harm departure was 
not appropriate because “no connection exists between the crime of illegal reentry and 
the perceived harm, which in this case involved severance of her parental rights.” Id. Al-
though the court did not use this as the basis for its decision, this argument reveals the 
government’s belief that deportation does not affect a parent’s ability to reunite with his or 
her child. 
206 Id. at 1158 (explaining that the statute “‘is designed to deter deported aliens from 
illegally reentering for any reason,’ thereby making ‘a deported alien’s unauthorized pres-
ence in the United States a crime in itself’”) (quoting Carrasco, 313 F.3d at 755). 
207 See, e.g., Saucedo-Patino, 358 F.3d at 794–95; Dyck, 334 F.3d at 741–42; Carrasco, 313 
F.3d at 755–56. The Tenth Circuit decided Hernadez-Baide before the Supreme Court’s 
decision in United States v. Booker, where the Court held that sentencing guidelines must be 
construed as advisory rather than mandatory. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 
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no leniency.208 The penalties for illegal reentry are significant and the 
immigrant’s motivations are irrelevant.209 Consequently, once parents 
are deported, it is very unlikely they will be able to return to contest the 
termination of their parental rights.210 
                                                                                                                      
(2005). As a result, the Court remanded the case but the Tenth Circuit subsequently rein-
stated its conviction. United States v. Hernadez-Baide, 146 F. App’x 302, 304 (10th Cir. 
2005); see also United States v. Mendez-Magana, 102 F. App’x 590, 591 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(demonstrating that, even post-Booker, downward departures for family circumstances are 
still not permissible). 
208 See Hernandez-Baide, 392 F.3d at 1154–55. 
209 See, e.g., United States v. Portillo-Alvarez, 223 F. App’x 821, 823 n.2 (10th Cir. 2007) 
(holding that “this court has specifically held that § 5K2.11 departures are not allowed in 
illegal reentry cases because the crime of illegal reentry is not a specific intent crime”); 
United States v. Prado-Jimenez, 223 F. App’x 818, 820 n.4 (10th Cir. 2007) (stating in dicta 
that “based on the analysis of departures in Hernandez-Baide . . . it would be likewise im-
proper for a district court to vary from the advisory guidelines range based solely on the 
defendant’s motivation for reentering the United States”); United States v. Barajas-Garcia, 
229 F. App’x 737, 741 (10th Cir. 2007) (stating “the criminal conduct of illegal reentry 
under which Mr. Barajas-Garcia was convicted, requires no specific motive or intent,” and 
thus the father’s purpose for reentry—to protect his infant son from his drug addicted 
mother—could not be considered); United States v. Herrera-Gonzalez, No. CR 07-1602 JB, 
2008 WL 2371564, at *9 (D.N.M. Feb. 6, 2008); United States v. Marinaro, No. CR-03-80-B-
W, 2005 WL 851334, at *10 (D. Me. April 13, 2005) (holding illegal reentry is a crime 
without a mens rea element). 
210 See Hernandez-Baide, 392 F.3d at 1154–55. Although immigrants often seek visas, 
such visas are commonly denied. See, e.g., Adegbuji v. Middlesex Cnty., 347 F. App’x 877, 
879–80, 882 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding that a district court did not abuse its discretion when 
finding that multiple denials for a visa to reenter the country to attend trial did not war-
rant continuance); Ordoñez v. Tacuri, No. 09-CV-1571 (FB), 2009 WL 2928903, at *1 n.1 
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2009) (noting that immigration officials denied a temporary visa to a 
mother that wished to attend a hearing in which she sought the return of her abducted 
son). One solution to this dilemma would be to make reentry for such purposes easier to 
obtain. The concerns posed by these cases, however, make this result unlikely. See Portillo-
Alvarez, 223 F. App’x at 823 n.2; Prado-Jimenez, 223 F. App’x at 820 n.4; Barajas-Garcia, 229 F. 
App’x at 741; Herrera-Gonzalez, 2008 WL 2371564, at *9; Marinaro, 2005 WL 851334, at *10. 
After a person has entered the country illegally, and particularly when he or she has com-
mitted a crime after unauthorized entry, the assumption is that the person is untrust-
worthy and the risk that they will overstay their visas is too great. See Portillo-Alvarez, 223 F. 
App’x at 823 n.2; Prado-Jimenez, 223 F. App’x at 820 n.4; Barajas-Garcia, 229 F. App’x at 741; 
Herrera-Gonzalez, 2008 WL 2371564, at *9; Marinaro, 2005 WL 851334, at *10. The likeli-
hood of permanent separation is also increased by the fact that many children are placed 
in English-speaking homes and lose the ability to communicate with their parents. Appell, 
supra note 126, at 771. Moreover, “federal law does not specifically require that children be 
placed in foster homes where their native or their parents’ native language is spoken,” 
which shows that maintenance of language skills and ability to speak with natural parents 
are viewed as unimportant. See id. (noting that “72% of children in immigrant families 
speak a language other than English at home, and in 26% of these homes, nobody four-
teen or older has a strong command of the English language”). 
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D. State Actions 
 In cases like In re Angelica L. and Anita C., courts demonstrate the 
belief that the primary consideration in parental rights termination 
cases should be the best interest of the immigrant child. Courts, how-
ever, did not reach this conclusion alone. In many instances, the actions 
of state child welfare agencies were instrumental in achieving termina-
tion.211 In numerous cases, state child welfare agencies did not simply 
remove children, they also created the grounds for termination.212 It is 
not uncommon for state child welfare agencies to withhold assistance, 
tell lies, and even contact immigration authorities if they believe such 
actions will ensure the termination of an immigrant parent’s rights.213 
 For example, agencies are often highly resistant to providing re-
unification assistance to undocumented parents.214 Even when reunifi-
cation is the stated goal and courts order reunification services, the ef-
fort expended by assigned caseworkers is frequently minimal or non-
existent.215 Again, In re Angelica L. is illustrative.216 First, the Spanish 
speaking mother received a non-Spanish speaking case worker.217 
Then, the caseworker gave her no contact information for her children 
and neglected to provide her with a physical copy of her case plan.218 
Finally, when the mother requested help complying with her case plan, 
the caseworker told her she would “‘have to take initiative for that’ her-
self.”219 Similarly, in In re B & J, the caseworker’s assistance in finding 
services for the parents consisted of a single phone call and an internet 
search.220 In addition, the caseworker made no effort to contact the 
parents after losing touch with them and refused to ask the child how 
to reach the parents because she “had not wanted to upset him.”221 
                                                                                                                      
 
211 See, e.g., In re B & J, 756 N.W.2d 234, 240 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008); Angelica L., 767 
N.W.2d at 95. 
212 See, e.g., In re B & J, 756 N.W.2d at 237. 
213 See, e.g., id. at 240; Angelica L., 767 N.W.2d at 95. 
214 See, e.g., In re B & J, 756 N.W.2d at 240; Angelica L., 767 N.W.2d at 95. 
215 See Angelica L., 767 N.W.2d at 83, 95. 
216 See id. 
217 Id. at 83. 
218 Id. at 83–84. 
219 Id. at 84. 
220 In re B & J, 756 N.W.2d at 238. 
221 Id.; see also Fairfax Cnty. Dep’t of Family Servs. v. Ibrahim, No. 0821-00-4, 2000 WL 
1847638, at *1 (Va. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2000) (noting that the state argued that “rendering 
little or no service to the father amounted to rendering reasonable services because it 
could not offer services during [the father’s] incarceration . . . .” and, according to the 
agency, “it had no way to provide services in Ghana”) Specifically, 
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 In other cases, agency employees actually lied to achieve the ter-
mination of an undocumented immigrant’s parental rights.222 For ex-
ample, the Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Human Re-
sources lied in numerous public statements about the danger that 
continued custody by Marta Alonzo, an undocumented immigrant 
teenage mother, posed to her son, Javier.223 According to the Commis-
sioner, the child had scabies and removal “saved his life.”224 He openly 
stated that “[t]here’s no question but that he was in imminent dan-
ger.”225 These statements were untrue.226 In fact, the child’s doctor 
publicly disputed this testimony, stating that Alonzo was a fit parent 
who sought medical treatment and never placed her child in danger.227 
Likewise, in In re Angelica L., a foreign home-study was conducted, 
which concluded that Luis was “able to provide a very stable life to her 
family . . . . [and] has a reputation in town as being an excellent 
mother.”228 However, because this was not the conclusion the state 
wanted, Nebraska DHHS requested a second report that “was a little 
more neutral.”229 
                                                                                                                      
 
the department failed to maintain contact with the father or to provide him 
with any services. It did not keep the father abreast of [his child’s] condition 
or residence, nor did it advise him of the children’s new foster care case-
worker . . . . The children’s guardian ad litem did not send him an introduc-
tory letter, and the children’s therapist never addressed reunification with 
their father . . . . [T]he department never evaluated him, assisted in his transi-
tion from incarceration, or investigated the possibility of coordinating efforts 
with an agency in Africa . . . . [T]he department’s expectation that the father 
contact the department [was] unreasonable because he did not know who 
was working with the children. 
Id. at *3. 
222 See Abrams, supra note 132. 
223 Id. Much about Javier’s removal is suspicious. When the Alabama Department of 
Human Resources became involved, rather than return the child and express shock at the 
women’s actions, the Department supported the removal and said that returning to the 
home was a health hazard. See id.; Rosemary Pennington, Fighting for Javier, WBHM Bir-
mingham (Feb. 6, 2004), http://www.wbhm.org/News/2004/Fighting_for_Javier.html. 
224 Abrams, supra note 132. 
225 Id. (adding that the baby was “in such bad shape from neglect” that after removal 
he needed to be admitted to the hospital). 
226 Id. 
227 See id. 
228 In re Angelica L., 767 N.W.2d at 87 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
229 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also In re M.M., 587 S.E.2d 825, 832 (Ga. 
Ct. App. 2003) (noting that, contrary to the state’s assertion that the father “never com-
pleted the anger management course[,] . . . . not only did the father attend a majority of 
the sessions of an anger management course, it appears that he has maintained a lifestyle 
free of domestic violence” and also exposing other conflicting statements by the state 
about the father’s parental bond, housekeeping, and permanent residence); E-mail from 
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 The above examples are telling, but the most shocking illustration 
of how state child welfare agencies have interfered and influenced ter-
mination decisions are cases in which welfare workers alerted ICE offi-
cials to a parent’s undocumented status to make termination easier.230 
Agencies are well aware that, after a child is removed, a parent’s subse-
quent deportation makes future reunification unlikely and termination 
almost inevitable.231 Consequently, parental deportation after removal 
is one of the most effective means of achieving termination of an im-
migrant parent’s rights and state agencies have taken advantage of this 
fact. 
 The deportation of Karen Arriaga is illuminating on this point.232 
Arriaga was an undocumented teenage mother of two whose children 
were removed by the Florida Department of Children and Families 
(DCF) based on questionable charges of neglect.233 After Arriaga’s 
children were taken into protective custody, members of Family Preser-
vation, a welfare group under contract with the Florida DCF told Ar-
riaga that she should go to their office for a supervised visit with her 
children.234 When she arrived at the facility, ICE officers were waiting to 
take her into custody.235 A week later, Arriaga’s parents received a simi-
lar call.236 They, too, reported to the Family Preservation office to visit 
                                                                                                                      
Hilda Lopez, supra note 179 (describing how the Massachusetts Department of Family 
Services “would not contact the Dominican Republic consulate or complete an interna-
tional home study,” and that “after a home study was completed by the appropriate protec-
tive agency in the Dominican Republic pursuant to a request by Mother and Mother’s 
counsel, the Juvenile Court Judge failed to recognize it”). 
230 See In re B & J, 756 N.W.2d at 237–38; Aisling Swift, Bonita Mom Gets Probation in Ne-
glect Case, Naples Daily News (Aug. 18, 2009), http://www.naplesnews.com/news/2009/ 
aug/18/bonita-mom-gets-probation-neglect-case. 
231 See, e.g., Anita C., 2009 WL 2859068 at *8 (showing that reunification after deporta-
tion is all but impossible because the mother would never be able to demonstrate her abil-
ity to provide proper care); In re B & J, 756 N.W.2d at 242 (describing deportation as a “de 
facto termination of parental rights”); In re Angelica L., 767 N.W.2d at 82–83 (noting that 
the lower court refused immediate reunification “because Maria had been deported to 
Guatemala”); Swift, supra note 230 (noting that deportation will prevent the mother from 
completing her probation and, with no means of completing her probation, reunification 
is unlikely). 
232 Swift, supra note 230. 
233 See id. The neglect charge stemmed from her inability to afford the medical care for 
her premature infant and her lack of transportation to get the child to her medical ap-
pointments. Id. 
234 See id. 
235 Id. 
236 Id. 
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with their grandchildren.237 As Arriaga’s mother held her grandchil-
dren, ICE officers arrived.238 
 State actors arranged the deportation of the parents in In re B & J 
in a similar manner.239 There, a judge ordered the state Department of 
Human Services (DHS) to provide reunification services to the un-
documented immigrant family.240 DHS objected to reunification and 
requested termination.241 After the family court denied this request, 
DHS reported the parents to ICE officials, who then deported the par-
ents.242 After the parents were deported, DHS renewed its petition to 
terminate their parental rights and, because the court found deporta-
tion made reunification unlikely, it granted the termination.243 
 In assessing the above actions, it is important to recognize that 
caseworkers and child welfare agencies have no obligation to report the 
immigration status of the families they visit, and mandating such re-
porting is likely unconstitutional.244 Nevertheless, although such re-
                                                                                                                      
 
237 Swift, supra note 230. 
238 Id. 
239 See In re B & J, 756 N.W.2d at 237. 
240 Id. 
241 Id. at 238 (“The caseworker confirmed that she believed that it had been [DHS’s] 
intention all along to have respondents deported.”). During this period, the services pro-
vided by DHS were meager and intended to subvert reunification. See id. In particular, 
DHS repeatedly prevented the children from attending scheduled visits with their parents. 
Id. 
242 Id. at 237. 
243 Id. at 238. The family court found DHS’s actions “morally repugnant.” Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless, the family court agreed that the children’s best 
interests required the termination of their parents’ rights. Id. Although the department 
had taken no efforts to find any services for the parents in Guatemala and had made no 
efforts to contact the respondents, the family court granted the termination petition 
merely because the children were in the United States. See id. The caseworker testified that 
she “had performed an internet search for possible services in Guatemala” but had “been 
unable to find any services” for them. Id. 
244 See United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 987 (D. Ariz. 2010); League of 
United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 786–87 (C.D. Cal. 1995). For exam-
ple, in the 2010 immigration case U.S. v. Arizona, Arizona had passed a law requiring its 
police officers to check immigration status under certain circumstances and make war-
rantless arrests if there was probable cause to believe a person removable from the United 
States. 703 F. Supp. 2d at 985. The court struck down the law, holding that it was pre-
empted by federal immigration law; thus, only Congress had the power to pass law regard-
ing immigration. Id. at 996. In League of United Latin American Citizens v. Wilson, the federal 
district court ruled that most of Proposition 187 was unconstitutional because it consti-
tuted state regulation of immigration. 908 F. Supp. at 786–87. Proposition 187, passed by 
California voters, was intended to “provide for cooperation between [the] agencies of state 
and local government with the federal government, and to establish a system of required 
notification by and between such agencies to prevent illegal aliens in the United States 
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porting is not required, it can be effective.245 Reporting a parent’s un-
documented status increases the likelihood of eventual termination, 
thus allowing immigrant children to remain in the United States with 
the possibility of being raised as part of an American family.246 For wel-
fare workers who believe such a result is in a child’s best interest, this is 
a strong incentive to report undocumented parents to ICE.247 
                                                                                                                      
from receiving benefits or public services in the State of California.” Id. at 763 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). The provision would have required any 
law enforcement, social services, health care and public education personnel 
to (i) verify the immigration status of persons with whom they come in con-
tact; (ii) notify certain defined persons of their immigration status; (iii) re-
port those persons to state and federal officials; and (iv) deny those persons 
social services, health care, and education. 
Id. The court struck down Proposition 187 as unconstitutional because it required state 
officers to determine immigration status, which amounted to unconstitutional state immi-
gration regulation. Id. at 769. According to the Court, state agencies could check the im-
migration status of persons to potentially deny state benefits but they could not “‘cooper-
ate’ with [federal immigration authorities], solely for the purpose of ensuring that such 
persons leave the country.” Id. at 771. Clearly, in both Arriaga’s story and the case of B & J, 
the state’s cooperation is for just such a purpose. See In re B & J, 756 N.W.2d at 237; Swift, 
supra note 230. But see Fonseca v. Fong, 84 Cal. Rptr. 3d 567, 579 (Ct. App. 2008) (a differ-
ent California district court held that notification provisions were constitutional because, 
unlike Proposition 187, the state did not have to make an independent determination). 
The above cases concern the constitutionality of statutes requiring notification, but the 
courts have also held that denials of benefits are unconstitutional. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 
U.S. 202, 230 (1982). Specifically, in Plyler v. Doe, the Supreme Court held it unconstitu-
tional to deny education to the children of undocumented immigrants. Id. The lower 
court in B & J and the child welfare agency in Arriaga’s story both denied undocumented 
families state assistance toward reunification—benefits just as important as the educational 
benefits at issue in Plyler. See id. at 202; In re B & J, 756 N.W.2d at 237; Swift, supra note 230. 
245 Rabin, supra note 10, at 140 (“One judge commented that attorneys often report to 
him that they have been unable to locate a client in immigration detention. He described, 
‘[t]here is a certain sense of, “well, it’s inevitable what’s going to happen.” I think that 
there’s a mentality out there with some of [the attorneys]: “What, is he going to re-
unify?”’”) (quoting Interview by Nina Rabin with J6, Judge, in Pima County, Ariz.). 
246 See Susan Redden, Carthage Board Conducts Hearing for Teacher, Joplin Globe (Aug. 
14, 2009), http://www.joplinglobe.com/carthage_jasper_county/x1896309960/Carthage-
board-conducts-hearing-for-teacher; Riojas, supra, note 132. Many of these cases contain 
legally questionable actions committed by non-state actors. See Redden, supra. For exam-
ple, Bail Romero’s son was taken by a local teacher’s aide who decided that it was in the 
son’s best interest to be adopted by a local couple and pressured Bail Romero in jail to 
sign the consent for adoption. See Riojas, supra note 132. In June of 2009, the school board 
accused the aide of immoral conduct for her part in arranging the adoption of Bail Ro-
mero’s son and recommended her termination. See Redden, supra. 
247 See, e.g., In re B & J, 756 N.W.2d at 237. In addition, such views are not limited to 
child welfare workers. See, e.g., Rabin, supra note 10, at 138 (describing “‘a judge who be-
lieved it was his obligation to ask everyone their legal status and then to report’”) (quoting 
Interview by Nina Rabin with J1, Judge, in Pima County, Ariz.). 
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E. Appellate Unfitness Decisions 
 Given the questionable practices and reasoning employed by lower 
courts and agencies in these immigrant parent termination cases, it is 
not surprising that, when such decisions have reached appellate courts, 
they have almost unanimously been overturned.248 It should also be 
noted, however, that appeals in undocumented immigrant parental 
rights termination cases are unlikely.249 When poor immigrant parents 
with no proficiency in English or even Spanish are deported to their 
home countries, their ability to pursue appeals is severely curtailed. 
Most cases that have been appealed involve parents lucky enough to 
have acquired exceptional legal assistance prior to deportation.250 
 One such example is In re Angelica L., where the lower court’s un-
fitness determination was reversed by the Nebraska Supreme Court 
which held that this conclusion was unsupported and therefore im-
proper. The Nebraska Supreme Court explained that the mother must 
be found unfit before any other considerations could be taken into ac-
count.251 The court made clear that Maria did not “forfeit her parental 
rights because she was deported” and further added that “[r]egardless 
of the length of time a child is placed outside the home, it is always the 
State’s burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the par-
ent is unfit.”252 In addition, unlike the lower court, the Nebraska Su-
                                                                                                                      
 
248 See, e.g., In re B & J, 756 N.W.2d at 237; In re Angelica L., 767 N.W.2d at 80. 
249 Telephone interview with Chris Huck, supra note 10. It is difficult to gauge how 
many cases exist that are not appealed because, as termination cases involve children, they 
are typically sealed, leaving no record. 
250 Id. Two of the most high profile cases, those of Maria Luis and Encarnación Bail 
Romero, received significant attention because the mothers had the good fortune to be-
come the pro bono clients of DLA Piper, one of the largest legal service providers in the 
world. See Riojas, supra, note 132. Similarly, the cases of Cerila Balthazar Cruz and Felipa 
Berrera were taken up by the Southern Poverty Law Center, a nationally recognized civil 
rights organization. See Cirila Baltazar Cruz, et al. v. Mississippi Department of Hum. Services, et 
al., S. Poverty L. Center, http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/case-docket/cruz (last 
visited Nov. 20, 2011); Immigrant Child Returns to Her Mixteco Family, S. Poverty L. Center, 
( June 10, 2005), http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/news/immigrant-child-returns-
to-her-mixteco-family. 
251 In re Angelica L., 767 N.W.2d at 92 (“[T]he interest of parents in the care, custody, 
and control of their children is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests 
recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court. Accordingly, before the State attempts to force a 
breakup of a natural family, over the objections of the parents and their children, the State 
must prove parental unfitness.”). 
252 Id. at 92, 94. While the court recognized that deportation can result in a parent’s 
separation from his or her child, it held that separation does not by itself “demonstrate 
parental unfitness.” Id. at 92. The court held that separation from one’s child for 15 of the 
past 22 months (the guideline established under the ASFA) does not demonstrate unfit-
ness. Id. “Instead, the placement of a child outside the home for 15 or more of the most 
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preme Court considered the difficulties facing undocumented immi-
grants like Maria; and was willing to consider the possibility that crossing 
the border with a newborn “in the belief that they would have a better 
life here” might actually demonstrate considerable care and concern for 
one’s child.253 Consequently, because the court found that “nothing in 
the record establishes that Maria is an unfit parent,” the court held that 
the termination of Maria’s parental rights was erroneous.254 
 Other appellate reversals reveal similar concerns.255 In In re V.S., 
The Court of Appeals of Georgia reversed the juvenile court’s unfitness 
determination, finding it improper to base a termination decision on 
the fact that the father “is an illegal alien and is subject to deporta-
tion.”256 Similarly, in In re B & J, the Supreme Court of Michigan re-
versed the family court’s unfitness decision and refused to allow the 
parents’ deportation to “constitute[] an improper, de facto termination 
of respondents’ parental rights.”257 The court explained that, “to com-
ply with the guarantees of substantive due process, the state must prove 
parental unfitness by ‘at least clear and convincing evidence’ before 
terminating a respondent’s parental rights.”258 The court then found 
                                                                                                                      
recent 22 months under § 43–292(7) merely provides a guideline for what would be a rea-
sonable time for parents to rehabilitate themselves to a minimum level of fitness.” Id. In 
addition, the court noted that “this circumstance would not exist had the State allowed 
Maria to take the children with her to Guatemala.” Id. at 94. The opinion also notes the 
lack of assistance Luis received from the state that made her compliance with the reunifi-
cation plan nearly impossible. In re Angelica L., 767 N.W.2d at 94–96. The case plan in-
cluded requirements such as obtaining employment and suitable housing but also re-
quirements such as attending parenting classes and completing a psychological evaluation. 
Id. at 83. Luis never received a copy of the plan, DHHS told her that arranging classes 
internationally was too difficult for DHHS, and she would have to take the initiative her-
self. Id. at 84, 95. Furthermore, because of the difficulties posed by her location, DHHS 
left it up to Maria to prove compliance with the plan. Id. at 84. Hannah, the social worker 
assigned to the case, admitted it was her responsibility to monitor Luis’s progress but ad-
mitted “that she could not do so because of Maria’s location.” Id. at 84. She later deter-
mined that Maria had failed to comply with the case plan. Id. 
253 Id. at 93. In addition, the court was also prepared to consider how the fear of de-
portation might have influenced Luis’s actions and to find that it excused some of her 
parental mistakes. See id. 
254 Id. 
255 See In re V.S., 548 S.E.2d at 494; In re B & J, 756 N.W.2d at 242. 
256 See In re V.S., 548 S.E.2d at 493. 
257 In re B & J, 756 N.W.2d at 241–42. The court recognized that once the parents were 
deported, it was “all but certain that respondents would be permanently separated from 
their children and that respondents would become unable to provide proper care and 
custody.” Id. at 242. 
258 Id. at 241 (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 748 (1982)). 
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that the family court erred in attributing such a showing to the Michi-
gan DHS.259 
 Even at the appellate level, however, not all cases are reversed.260 
When such decisions are affirmed, the appellate courts do so in the 
same manner as the lower courts: they ignore the fitness requirement 
and focus entirely on the question of the child’s best interest.261 For 
example, in Perez-Velasquez v. Culpeper County Department of Social Services, 
the Virginia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s holding that the 
deported father had, “without good cause, failed to maintain continu-
ing contact with and to provide or substantially plan for the future of 
the child[ren].”262 The court further held that it “‘is clearly not in the 
best interests of a child to spend a lengthy period of time waiting to 
find out when, or even if, a parent will be capable of resuming his [or 
her] responsibilities.’”263 Similarly, in Anita C., the appellate court 
agreed that the child’s best interest was the only relevant consideration 
and that the mother’s fitness was irrelevant.264 
 These above cases demonstrate the extreme lengths to which some 
courts and agencies will go to terminate parental rights in favor of what 
they perceive to be the best interest of the child.265 Despite the obvious 
intention to do what is good for the child, however, employing a best 
interest standard does not guarantee that termination decisions will be 
made according to the child’s actual best interest.266 
                                                                                                                      
 
259 Id. at 242. 
260 See, e.g., Anita C., 2009 WL 2859068, at *11; Perez-Velasquez, 2009 WL 1851017, at *4. 
261 See Anita C., 2009 WL 2859068, at *9–10; Perez-Velasquez, 2009 WL 1851017, at *2. 
262 2009 WL 1851017, at *2 n.1 (quoting Va. Code Ann. § 16.1-283 (2011)). 
263 Id. at *2 n.1, *3 (quoting Kaywood v. Halifax Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 394 S.E.2d 
492, 495 (Va. Ct. App. 1990)). 
264 See Anita C., 2009 WL 2859068 *8–9. Other scholars have noted the assumptions re-
garding the unfitness of African-American families. See, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, Is There 
Justice in Children’s Rights?: The Critique of Federal Family Preservation Policy, 2 U. Pa. J. Const. 
L. 112, 131 (1999) (“Poor black mothers are stereotyped as deviant and uncaring; they are 
blamed for transferring a degenerate lifestyle of welfare dependency and crime to their 
children. Black fathers are simply thought to be absent.”) (internal citations omitted). In 
this sense, undocumented parents are treated similarly to other poor, non-white parents. 
See, e.g., In re V.S., 548 S.E.2d at 493; Roberts, supra, at 131. Yet, as these cases show, immi-
gration status makes such actions more likely and harder to combat. See In re V.S., 548 
S.E.2d at 493; In re B & J, 756 N.W.2d at 242. 
265 See Anita C., 2009 WL 2859068, at *9–10; Perez-Velasquez, 2009 WL 1851017, at *2. 
266 See Anita C., 2009 WL 2859068, at *9–10; Perez-Velasquez, 2009 WL 1851017, at *2. As 
discussed below, this question has been explored in the context of African-American re-
movals and terminations, and it was in the context of the removal of African-American 
children that best interest considerations and the Children’s Rights Movement evolved. 
Although African-American terminations demonstrate a similar elevation of best interests 
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V. Best Interests and Better Parents 
 The United States has a long history of removal decisions that are, 
in hindsight, unwise or even harmful.267 Best interest standards are sub-
jective and are susceptible to bias.268 Consequently, even if choosing 
children’s rights over parental rights will benefit children in theory, this 
does not mean they will result in better outcomes in practice.269 
A. Parental Rights vs. Children’s Rights 
 The primary purpose of the parental rights doctrine and the fitness 
standard is to ensure parental autonomy in raising children.270 The 
strong protection afforded to parental rights is justified by the belief 
that this protection also benefits children and the state.271 The doctrine 
contains the following presumptions: (1) children benefit because the 
biological parents have strong incentives to take care of their children, 
and (2) the state benefits because parental independence from the state 
enables them to raise children to be independent citizens equipped 
with the ability to make independent personal and political choices. 272 
In addition, the parental rights doctrine also incorporates the belief that 
independence from state interference guarantees a meaningful right to 
privacy by ensuring that many of the most intimate aspects of a persons’ 
                                                                                                                      
over parental rights, the removals and terminations in the immigrant context are quite 
different. 
267 See Stephen O’Connor, Orphan Trains: The Story of Charles Loring Brace 
and the Children He Saved and Failed 202 (2001); Marcia Zug, Dangerous Gamble: Child 
Support, Casino Dividends, and the Fate of the Indian Family, 36 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 738, 
771–74 (2010). 
268 See, e.g., In re V.S., 548 S.E.2d 490, 494 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001); In re B & J, 756 N.W.2d 
234, 242 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008). 
269 See, e.g., In re V.S., 548 S.E.2d at 494; In re B & J, 756 N.W.2d at 242. 
270 See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982); see also Bruce A. Boyer & Steven 
Lubet, The Kidnapping of Edgardo Mortara: Contemporary Lessons in the Child Welfare Wars, 45 
Vill. L. Rev. 245, 253 (2000) (stating that “[c]entral to the Court’s decision in Santosky is 
its view that any effort to sever the parent-child relationship . . . , must begin with an in-
quiry that is parent-focused”). 
271 See Katherine K. Baker, Bionormativity and the Construction of Parenthood, 42 Ga. L. Rev. 
649, 712 (2008) (discussing the assumptions that children “benefit from strong parental 
rights and . . . are hurt when a Big Brother state starts dictating parenting practices”). 
272 Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602–03 (1979) (“[P]ages of human experience . . . 
teach that parents generally do act in the child’s best interests.”); Appell, supra note 35, at 
709 (explaining that “it is the parent’s role to raise and nurture children to become ma-
ture adults who are able to exercise political choice . . . . [and] this role requires a measure 
of independence from the state”); see also Mary L. Shanley, Unwed Fathers’ Rights, Adoption, 
and Sex Equality: Gender-Neutrality and the Perpetuation of Patriarchy, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 60, 85 
(1995). 
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life remain private.273 However, the assumption that parents will always 
act in their children’s best interests is problematic. Parental rights can 
conflict with children’s rights and, in those circumstances, the choice to 
protect parental rights may not be in a child’s best interest.274 
 The above termination cases exemplify this dilemma. In these 
cases, the courts refused to uphold the parents’ rights to the care and 
custody of their child, finding that such a decision would not be in that 
child’s best interest.275 Instead, each court viewed termination as pref-
erable.276 The justifications given in these cases for why termination is 
in a child’s best interest can be broken down into three distinct but re-
lated categories. First, it is not in a child’s best interest to move to a for-
eign country he or she may never have visited, where the child may not 
speak the language, and where the child may have much more limited 
opportunities.277 Second, it is in a child’s best interest to remain in 
America because it is home, the standard of living is higher, and the 
opportunities are better.278 Third, it is in a child’s best interest to re-
main in the United States because the child may have become attached 
to his or her current caregiver, the caregiver may wish to adopt the 
child, and adoption is in the child’s best interest because it will enable 
the child to become part of an American family.279 These justifications 
                                                                                                                      
 
273 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003) (extending the zone of pri-
vacy to cover same sex sexual relationships); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 165–66 (1973) (rec-
ognizing a right to abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (extending this 
right to unmarried couples); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965) (recogniz-
ing the right to privacy in the context of intimate marital relations); Appell, supra note 35, at 
708 (noting this right is based on the idea that “family relationships and issues are protected 
because families are intimate associations created and controlled by autonomous adults”). 
Justice Brandeis famously defined the right to privacy as the “right to be let alone.” Samuel D. 
Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 195 (1890). 
274 See Anita C. v. Superior Court, No. B213283, 2009 WL 2859068, at *9–10 (Cal. Ct. 
App. Sept. 8, 2009); Perez-Velasquez v. Culpeper Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., No. 0360-09-4, 
2009 WL 1851017, at *3 (Va. Ct. App. June 30, 2009). For a further discussion of this con-
flict between parental rights and children’s and state interests, see Zug, supra note 15, at 
1180–82. 
275 See Anita C., 2009 WL 2859068, at *9–10; Perez-Velasquez, 2009 WL 1851017, at *3. 
276 See Anita C., 2009 WL 2859068, at *9–10; Perez-Velasquez, 2009 WL 1851017, at *3. 
277 See Rabin, supra note 10, at 139 (“[The lawyer] went on to describe a case in which 
a child would need ongoing medical treatment and the parents were in Agua Prieta. The 
judge was very reluctant to return the child to her parents because of concerns about the 
availability of care. The attorney recalled, ‘[w]e were saying that she can get treatment in 
Mexico, it’s not like medieval Europe. [And the] judge said, “Well, I don’t know about 
that.”’”) (quoting Interview by Nina Rabin with A6, Attorney, in Pima County, Ariz.). 
278 See Anita C., 2009 WL 2859068, at *9. 
279 Shani King, Challenging Monohumanism: An Argument for Changing the Way We Think 
About Intercountry Adoption, 30 Mich. J. Int’l L. 413, 439–40 (2009) (describing this as the 
“Improved Life Chances Narrative,” which “describe[s] the opportunities for adoptive 
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frequently overlap, and many termination decisions rely on a combina-
tion of the three.280 
 For example, in In re Angelica L., the state presented evidence to 
demonstrate that “living in Guatemala would put [the children] at a 
disadvantage compared to living in the United States.”281 The state 
called a clinical psychologist to testify that, “if the children were sent to 
Guatemala, they would ‘experience culture shock, disorientation, fear-
fulness, sadness and anger.’”282 He also “testified that the standard of 
living in Guatemala is lower than the standard in the United States, the 
people are poorer, and there are less economic opportunities.”283 The 
purpose of this testimony was to contrast the life the children would 
have in Guatemala with the life the children would have with their fos-
ter family in the United States.284 After hearing this evidence, the trial 
court decided that the children should not return to Guatemala and 
terminated the mother’s parental rights.285 The court held that because 
“neither Angelica nor Daniel [were] familiar with Guatemala,” and be-
cause they “were thriving in the only locality they have ever known with 
the only parental figures they have ever known,” termination was in 
their best interests.286 
                                                                                                                      
 
children as improved in the United States, and in doing so, implying the superiority of 
upper- and middle-class parents to poor birth parents”); see also Rashmi Goel, From Tainted 
to Sainted: The View of Interracial Relations as Cultural Evangelism, 2007 Wis. L. Rev. 489, 526 
(describing the case of Anna Mae He, and explaining that her foster parents, the “Bakers, 
were determined to keep Anna Mae, not just because they loved her, but because they 
believed that returning her to her biological parents would force her to be Chinese, when 
she had the opportunity to be American”). 
280 See Goel, supra note 279, at 522 (discussing how notions of “foreignness and exoti-
cism” can influence custody decisions and describing the competing interests in these cases 
as between “family unity and the desire consistent with the Missionary-Heathen paradigm, to 
save children of color”). 
281 In re Angelica L., 767 N.W.2d 74, 94 (Neb. 2009). Similarly, in Fairfax County De-
partment of Family Services v. Ibrahim, the state argued for termination based on the believed 
inferiority of the home and services that the father could provide to his children in Ghana. 
See No. 0821-00-4, 2000 WL 1847638, at *3 (Va. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2000). The state made 
this argument without offering any “information about the situation in Ghana” and with-
out making any “efforts to determine the conditions there.” Id. The state’s argument was 
simply based on assumptions regarding the inferiority of life in Ghana. See id. 
282 In re Angelica L., 767 N.W.2d at 84. 
283 Id. at 85. He was, however, unable to answer questions when asked about the educa-
tional and athletic opportunities available in Guatemala. See id. 
284 See id. 
285 See id. at 87–88. 
286 See id. at 88. On appeal the court rejected such considerations, holding that 
“whether living in Guatemala or the United States is more comfortable for the children is 
not determinative of the children’s best interests . . . . [T]he ‘best interests’ of the child 
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 In Anita C. v. Superior Court, the Los Angeles County Superior Court 
found it was in the child’s best interest to remain with foster parents be-
cause the foster parents wished to adopt him and could better provide 
for him.287 Specifically, the court held that “[t]heir home is virtually the 
only one he has ever known and, not surprisingly, he has become ex-
tremely bonded with them.”288 Similarly, at Bail Romero’s termination 
hearing, the Missouri Court of Appeals contrasted the immigrant 
mother with the potential adoptive mother.289 The court described Bail 
Romero as having little to offer her son Carlos, stating that “[t]he only 
certainties in [Mother’s] future is that she will remain incarcerated until 
next year, and that she will be deported thereafter.”290 The court con-
trasted this bleak future with that of the prospective adoptive parents, 
who made a “comfortable living, had rearranged their lives and work 
schedules to provide Carlos a stable home, and had support from their 
extended family.”291 Consequently, the court held it was in Carlos’s best 
interest to be placed with the adoptive family and terminated Bail Ro-
mero’s parental rights.292 
                                                                                                                      
 
standard does not require simply that a determination be made that one environment or 
set of circumstances is superior to another.” Id. at 94. The court then explained that 
unless Maria is found to be unfit, the fact that the state considers certain 
adoptive parents, in this case the foster parents, better, or this environment 
better, does not overcome the commanding presumption that reuniting the 
children with Maria is in their best interests—no matter what country she 
lives in. As we have stated, this court has never deprived a parent of the cus-
tody of a child merely because on financial or other grounds a stranger might 
better provide. 
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
287 See Anita C., 2009 WL 2859068, at *9–10. 
288 Id. at *9. 
289 See In re C.M.B.R., No. SD 30342, 2010 WL 2841486, at *4 (Mo. Ct. App. July 21, 
2010), rev’d 332 S.W.3d 793 (Mo. 2011). 
290 Id. 
291 Thompson, supra note 10. 
292 See In re C.M.B.R., 2010 WL 2841486, at *4. The story of Marta Alonzo is also simi-
lar. See Pennington, supra note 223. There, the mother’s alleged unfitness was simply a ruse 
to separate Alonzo from her child, deport her back to Guatemala, and allow her son to be 
adopted by a white, middle class, American family. See id. Before the mother had any 
chance to remedy the alleged grounds that led to a finding of unfitness, the child welfare 
agency had the adoption paperwork ready. See id.; see also In re M.M., 587 S.E.2d 825, 832 
(Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (“The court terminated the father’s parental rights[,] . . . determining 
that the father had done nothing to legalize his residency in the United States, that even if 
he later attempted to do so, he would face deportation, that the child could then be re-
turned to protective custody or taken with her father to ‘an unknown future in Mexico,’ 
and that it was unwilling to subject [him] to those possibilities.”); In re B & J, 756 N.W.2d 
at 241 (revealing the state’s argument that termination was in “the children’s best interests 
because the children will have a better and more prosperous life in the United States than 
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 These cases exemplify the belief that remaining in the United 
States and growing up with a “typical” American family is in the best 
interests of immigrant children.293 However, just because these beliefs 
are strongly held does not mean they are correct. There is a long his-
tory of prejudice towards immigrant and minority families and the be-
lief in the inferiority of their caregiving.294 This history has demon-
strated that a best interest standard is easily susceptible to cultural and 
racial conceptions of what is in a child’s best interest.295 The separation 
of immigrant families may simply be the most recent iteration of this 
phenomenon.296 
B. Best Interest Considerations and Indian Children 
 The history of separating Indian children from their parents pro-
vides a compelling example of how biases may influence perceptions 
and decisions regarding a child’s best interest. The nineteenth century 
witnessed many attempts to solve the “Indian problem,” typically de-
scribed as the Indian people’s failure to accept Anglo-American “civili-
zation.”297 By the end of the century, reformers agreed that the best 
                                                                                                                      
in Guatemala”); Interview with Linda Brandmiller, Dir. of Immigration Servs., Catholic 
Charities Archdiocese of San Antonio (Aug. 13, 2009) (describing a Texas case where the 
court refused to return a special needs child to fit parents because the medical services 
available in Mexico were considered inadequate and he was doing well with his foster par-
ents). 
293 See In re C.M.B.R., 2010 WL 2841486, at *4; Julian et al., supra note 126, at 31. In 
fact, this message is so strong it may be influencing immigrant family cases where deporta-
tion is not even an issue. See Appell, supra note 126, at 778. An immigrant, Spanish speak-
ing grandmother—raising a large family and wanting to provide for her newborn grand-
daughter—lost custody in favor of 
the Whiter, more middle class family—the English-speaking family with a 
higher socioeconomic status—in whose care N.S. would become Whiter than 
she might with her LEP, working poor, single grandmother supporting seven 
children. The assimilationist force of the child welfare system thus drove the 
case in the agency and lower court, despite Nevada’s clear policy to place 
children with kin. 
Id. 
294 See Appell, supra note 126, at 765; Julian et al., supra note 126, at 31. 
295 See Appell, supra note 128, at 765; Julian et al., supra note 126, at 31. 
296 Rabin, supra note 10, at 137–38 (“[N]early all of the twenty-six CPS workers who re-
sponded [to a survey] thought the undocumented parents would be more likely to have 
problems with domestic violence, and roughly one quarter thought they would be more like-
ly to have problems with child neglect, abandonment, substance abuse, and mental health. 
These figures suggest that a significant number of caseworkers assume negative characteris-
tics of immigrant families in the absence of any individualized basis for the assumption.”). 
297 Appell, supra note 126, at 762. This same criticism is often directed at immigrant 
families. See id. at 762–63. 
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method for saving the Indian people was to separate children from 
their parents and tribes.298 These reformers considered separation to 
be in a child’s best interest because it would protect them from the 
damaging influences of their parents and provide them with the so-
called benefits of civilization.299 They believed that once removed from 
the harmful influences of their families, Indian children would be able 
to avoid the poverty and other negative consequences that increasingly 
characterized tribal life.300 
 The initial separations of Indian children from their families typi-
cally involved placement in boarding schools.301 By the 1950s, the fed-
eral government finally acknowledged that removal to these schools 
harmed Indian children.302 Nevertheless, the belief that removal was in 
the best interests of Indian children continued.303 The Indian Adop-
tion Project, a joint effort between the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the 
Child Welfare League, replaced the boarding schools.304 The purpose 
of this program was to facilitate the adoption of Indian children by 
non-Indian families, something both organizations advocated as in the 
children’s best interests.305 
 Congress finally curtailed the practice of separating Indian chil-
dren from their families in 1978 with the passage of the Indian Child 
Welfare Act.306 The Act recognized the devastation that such removals 
were having on the tribes and also recognized the legitimacy and value 
of Indian families and their care-giving practices.307 Scholars and other 
                                                                                                                      
 
298 See id. at 762. 
299See Zug, supra note 267, at 774. Such reformers believed that as long as Indian chil-
dren were “‘associating all their highest ideals of manhood and womanhood with fathers 
who are degraded and mothers who are debased,’” they would never become healthy, pro-
ductive members of society. Id. (quoting Linda J. Lacey, The White Man’s Law and the Ameri-
can Indian Family in the Assimilation Era, 40 Ark. L. Rev. 327, 360 (1986)). 
300 See Zug, supra note 267, at 774–76. For example, Nineteenth century Indian fami-
lies met public condemnation for allowing women to work, for sharing parenting duties 
among extended family members, and for their resistance to corporal punishment. See id. 
at 770–74. 
301 Id. at 775. 
302 See id. at 776–77. 
303 See id. at 777. 
304 See id. at 777 n.221. 
305 See Zug, supra note 267, at 777. The project was also strongly supported by child wel-
fare workers who, during the 1960s and ’70s, “removed 25% to 35% of Indian children 
from their homes to foster and adoptive homes . . . .” Appell, supra note 126, at 762. 
306 See generally Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-608, 92 Stat. 3069 
(codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1963 (2006)). 
307 See id. § 2, 25 U.S.C. § 1901. For example, Congress recognized that the value of In-
dian kinship care arrangements is common in Indian families which social workers had pre-
viously viewed as neglectful. See Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
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child advocates in modern times are sharply critical of these former 
Indian policies.308 What was once considered a bad parent is now ac-
knowledged to simply be a different parent.309 
C. Best Interests and Nineteenth Century Immigrant Children 
 A second historic example is even more reminiscent of the removal 
practices modern courts and child welfare agencies are employing with 
respect to immigrant children. In the nineteenth century, thousands of 
children were placed on “orphan trains” and sent to the homes of fami-
lies in the West and Midwest.310 Despite the label orphan, many of these 
children were not orphans.311 “They were, instead, mostly children of 
Catholic recent immigrants, sent away by wealthy, Protestant ‘child sav-
ers.’”312 These reformers considered the existence of the children’s par-
ents irrelevant because, according to the child savers, the parents were 
undesirable.313 The child savers believed their actions were in the chil-
dren’s best interests.314 At the time, their actions seemed acts “of nearly 
unassailable wisdom and compassion.”315 Over time, however, these 
“savers” have come to be regarded as “cruelly indifferent to the very 
children [they] had been designed to help.”316 
                                                                                                                      
Indian Affairs and Public Lands of the H. Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 95th Cong. 96–42, 
at 69 (1978) (statement of LeRoy Wilder, Associate Attorney); H.R. Rep. No. 95-1386, at 2 
(1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530, 7531. 
308 See, e.g., Barbara Atwood, The Voice of the Indian Child: Strengthening the Indian Child 
Welfare Act Through Children’s Participation, 50 Ariz. L. Rev. 127, 133 (2008) (describing 
policies from boarding schools to the Indian Adoption Project as “misguided paternalism, 
ethnocentrism and outright racism”). 
309 See Zug, supra note 267, at 770. 
310 See O’Connor, supra note 267, at 202. By 1929 when the last orphan train departed, 
approximately 250,000 children had been sent west. Id. at xvii. 
311 Id. at 98–99 (“Victorian families used orphanages as places to park their children 
during family crises. A substantial portion of children in orphanages were there only for a 
year or two . . . .”); see also id. at 107 (describing how children were placed on orphan trains 
without inquiry into the claims of orphanhood). 
312 Guggenheim, supra note 34, at 182; see Appell, supra note 126, at 763 (stating that 
these “‘saved’ children were primarily from immigrant, Catholic working class and poor 
families headed by single mothers”). 
313 See Linda Gordon, The Great Arizona Orphan Abduction 10–11 (1999). “Chil-
dren who appeared to child savers as uncared-for strays were often contributing to their 
families’ incomes by begging, peddling, gathering castoffs for use or resale, selling their 
services, or stealing.” Id. The Catholic Charities did not make such severe moral judgments 
and instead tried to help the families rather than blaming single mothers or treating them 
as “fallen.” See id. at 15. 
314 See Appell, supra note 126, at 763–64. 
315 O’Connor, supra note 267, at xix. 
316 Id. 
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D. The Disproportionality Movement 
 As the above examples demonstrate, the removal of minority chil-
dren from their homes is not unprecedented. It has happened in the 
past and is continuing in the present. 
 A modern movement, termed the disproportionality movement, 
has raised concerns of bias in the context of African-American parent 
termination cases.317 The disproportionality movement arose as a reac-
tion to the growing emphasis on children’s rights.318 It posits that one 
of the consequences of the “systemic biases in child welfare system deci-
sion-making” is that children are being removed from their families 
unnecessarily.319 In particular, the movement focuses on the dispropor-
tionate number of African-American children in foster care as com-
pared to their percentage of the general population.320 The move-
ment’s proponents argue that this “disproportionality” demonstrates a 
bias in removal decisions.321 
 Many studies have demonstrated how bias can and does affect de-
cision-making.322 Child welfare decisions by their nature are highly sub-
jective and therefore can provide an easy avenue for expressing bias.323 
                                                                                                                      
317 See Bartholet, supra note 14, at 871. Professor Bartholet appears to have been the 
first to refer to disproportionality arguments as representing a movement. Id. 
318 See Guggenheim, supra note 34, at 5–6; Bartholet, supra note 14, at 871. Professor 
Guggenheim argues it 
is not coincidental that the call for the permanent banishment of birth par-
ents reached its zenith when the foster care population reached an unprece-
dented high of being nonwhite. As a result of this major policy change [seek-
ing to terminate parents], an official goal of U.S. policy today is to socially 
engineer the makeup of the families raising poor, nonwhite children. 
Id. at 205. Guggenheim notes that “of the 42,000 children in [New York City] foster care in 
December 1997, only 3.1 percent were categorized as ‘non-Hispanic white.’” Id. This “means 
that, somehow or other, New York City has found a way to maintain a child welfare system for 
its white population that treats placement in foster care as an extremely rare event.” Id. 
319 See Bartholet, supra note 14, at 873, 878–79. 
320 Id. at 871. 
321 Jessica Dixon, The African-American Child Welfare Act: A Legal Redress for African-
American Disproportionality in Child Protection Cases, 10 Berkeley J. Afr.-Am. L. & Pol’y 109, 
112 (2008). The purpose of the disproportionality movement is to focus attention on the 
problem of racism in the child welfare system. See id. But see Bartholet, supra note 14, at 905 
(arguing that such bias may be less likely in the child welfare system because of the high 
number of black and other minority social workers). 
322 See, e.g., Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 Cal. L. Rev. 
969, 975 n.31 (2006) (noting “[t]he legal literature on implicit bias is by now enormous”); 
Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1489, 1512–14 (2005) (describing stud-
ies revealing implicit bias); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: 
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 317, 322–23 (1987). 
323 See Gordon, supra note 313, at 10–11; Appel, supra note 126, at 764–65. 
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Consequently, the movement’s adherents argue that biased beliefs re-
garding the inferiority of African-American families and their care-
giving cause child welfare workers to disproportionally and unnecessar-
ily remove African-American children from their parents.324 Welfare 
workers perceive these removals to be in the children’s best interests 
because they believe they are removing children from “bad” parents 
and making them available for adoption by “good” parents.325 Scholars 
such as Michelle Goodwin have noted, however, that adoption—at least 
in the African-American context—is not the panacea imagined.326 In-
stead, many of these children will spend the remainder of their child-
hoods in foster care, the negative effects of which are numerous and 
well documented.327 Therefore, although the increase in removals was 
                                                                                                                      
324 Bartholet, supra note 14, at 873. In the context of African-American families, such bi-
ases frequently pertain to beliefs that African-American parents are more likely to take drugs 
and physically abuse their children than their white counterparts. See, e.g., Peggy C. Davis & 
Richard G. Dudley, Jr., The Black Family in Modern Slavery, 4 Harvard Blackletter J. 9, 10–
15 (1987); Dixon, supra note 321, at 117–18 (discussing studies demonstrating that African-
American children were more likely to have skeletal surveys done to check for fractures and 
more likely to be tested for drugs); Annette R. Appell, Disposable Mothers, Deployable Children, 9 
Mich. J. Race & L. 421, 442 (2004) (reviewing Randall Kennedy, Interracial Intimacies: 
Sex, Marriage, Identity, and Adoption (2003)) (noting “empirical evidence indicates that 
child welfare professionals view Black families as less viable, less resourceful, and, conse-
quently, in need of coercive state intervention”). See generally Dorothy Roberts, Shattered 
Bonds: The Color of Child Welfare 7–10 (2002) (describing the disproportionate num-
ber of African-American children in the child welfare system). 
325 See Appel, supra note 126, at 765. As scholars such as Professor Martin Guggenheim 
have noted, a court’s use of the best interest test is often influenced by its own value judg-
ments. See, e.g., Painter v. Bannister, 140 N.W.2d 152, 156 (Iowa 1966) (denying custody to 
fit father based on “unstable, unconventional, arty, Bohemian” lifestyle); Guggenheim, 
supra note 34, at 39–40. 
326 See Michele Goodwin, Relational Markets in Intimate Goods, 44 Tulsa L. Rev. 803, 821 
(2009). For a discussion of the illusory nature of adoption, see id. at 821 n.133 (“As a con-
temporary model, the disproportionately low adoption rate for black children in foster 
care gives some indication of the continued illusory nature of adoption as a specialized 
child-focused welfare service model.”) (citing Richard P. Barth, Effects of Age and Race on the 
Odds of Adoption Versus Remaining in Long-Term Out-of-Home Care, 76 Child Welfare 285, 
288 (1997) (noting the adoption rates of white children in the Michigan foster care system 
are three times greater than black children)); Jane C. Murphy, Protecting Children by Preserv-
ing Parenthood, 14 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 969, 982 (2006) (noting that “children left 
behind in permanent foster care status are disproportionately African American and, as 
they age, are practically unadoptable”); see also Caring for Children: Who Will Adopt the Foster 
Care Children Left Behind?, Urb. Inst., ( June, 2003), http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/ 
310809_caring_for_children_2.pdf (“Compared with children still in foster care, those who 
are adopted are younger and more likely to be female, Caucasian, and Hispanic . . . . 
[T]hose awaiting adoption tend to be . . . older, male, and black . . . .”). 
327 See Murphy, supra note 326, at 982. 
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spurred by the desire to help children, these removals may be working 
against their best interests.328 
E. Good Parents vs. Immigrant Parents 
 The separation of immigrant parents from their children seems to 
be based on similar assumptions regarding good parents and the belief 
that children have the right to be raised by good parents.329 Obviously 
the definition of a good parent is subjective.330 Typically, a good parent 
is defined in relation to dominant cultural norms.331 According to Pro-
fessor Annette Appell, this means “married; White; Christian (prefera-
bly Protestant); Anglo; and relatedly, English-speaking; and middle 
class.”332 Defining a good parent in relation to these norms can be par-
ticularly problematic for immigrant parents because these norms may 
differ significantly from the norms present in their country of origin.333 
For example, American norms hold that families should be independ-
ent and not too reliant on extended family or community members.334 
As Professor Naomi Cahn has noted, this means that parents, and par-
ticularly mothers, are expected “to be primarily responsible for their 
children.”335 Consequently, although sharing child care responsibilities 
among extended family is common throughout much of the world, 
parents living in the United States who delegate that responsibility to 
others, such as a grandparent or an older child may be considered bad 
parents.336 
                                                                                                                      
328 Id. 
329See Goel, supra note 279, at 526–527. 
330 See id. at 526 (describing how, “[b]ecause of their own bias against the culture and way 
of life in China, the [foster parents] felt the need to rescue Anna Mae from a life there”). 
331 See id. 
332 Appell, supra note 126, at 765; see also Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Rape, Race, and Represen-
tation: The Power of Discourse, Discourses of Power, and the Reconstruction of Heterosexuality, 49 
Vand. L. Rev. 869, 904–05 (1996) (describing how the image of motherhood in black and 
Hispanic cultures is different from the dominant norm and, as a result, these families are 
viewed “as failed versions of the white, male-headed nuclear family”). 
333 See Appell, supra note 126, at 765. 
334 See id. This is especially problematic for immigrant parents who often come from so-
cieties where it is common for children to be raised by grandparents and where older siblings 
are frequently made responsible for their younger siblings’ care. See Solangel Maldonado, 
The Role of Race, Ethnicity and Culture in Custody Disputes 14 (unpublished manuscript) 
(on file with the author) (noting that “in Asia and Latin-America, older children are rou-
tinely given significant responsibilities for their younger siblings’ care”). 
335 See Naomi Cahn, Policing Women: Moral Arguments and the Dilemmas of Criminalization, 
49 DePaul L. Rev. 817, 822 (2000). 
336 See Maldonado, supra note 334, at 14. 
2012] Separation, Deportation, Termination 111 
 Similarly, living arrangements that are common throughout the 
world, such as two families sharing a home or three people sharing a 
bedroom, can be viewed with suspicion when practiced in the United 
States.337 Accommodations that do not afford children the level of pri-
vacy typical in American families are treated with concern by American 
courts and child welfare agencies.338 In addition, educational deficien-
cies or medical conditions that are often left untreated in countries 
with more limited resources will be viewed with serious concern by U.S. 
courts and agencies.339 What was a rational decision in a parent’s home 
country may be considered unjustified by American institutions.340 
These examples illustrate how courts and welfare agencies that evaluate 
immigrant parents in relation to white, middle class, English-speaking 
norms may be more likely to judge parents unfit.341 
 Although divergence from these norms creates difficulties for 
many minority parents, it is particularly problematic for immigrant 
parents.342 In most cases, explicit bias against minority groups is con-
                                                                                                                      
 
337 Id. at 14 (citing Rico v. Rodriguez, 120 P.3d 812 (Nev. 2005)). 
338 Id. at 14–15. 
339 Id. at 15. 
340 See Goel, supra note 279, at 527 (noting that the guardian ad litem’s best interest 
determination was influenced by the fact that “she had read a book about Chinese girls 
being placed in orphanages and consequently was concerned that the parents wanted to 
return to China . . . .”). 
341 See Appell, supra note 126, at 770. The perceived unfitness of parents who do not 
speak English is demonstrated by the lack of child welfare officials that speak other lan-
guages. See id. The result is that only English-speaking parents are able to receive meaning-
ful assistance. See id. (describing the child welfare system in Las Vegas and noting the “rar-
ity of Spanish-speaking (and other foreign language speaking) case workers, a dearth of 
translators on staff in child welfare offices, and perhaps an absence of Spanish-speaking 
teams of social workers in the child welfare system despite [its] geographical concentra-
tions of Latino communities”); see also Julian et al., supra note 126, at 31 (observing that 
the “parenting styles of Caucasian, middle-class parents are then used as the benchmark 
against which other groups are compared, with an assumption of Caucasian superiority”). 
It should be noted that these assumptions are not only relevant in termination cases but 
are frequently applied in custody disputes between biological parents. See, e.g., Rico, 120 
P.3d at 818–19 (giving custody preference to the permanent resident father over the un-
documented immigrant mother); Ramirez v. Ramirez, Nos. 2005-CA-002554-ME, 2006-CA-
000010-ME, 2007 WL 1192587, at *3 (Ky. Ct. App. Apr. 13, 2007) (finding that the deter-
mination of a father’s immigration status was appropriate in a custody hearing). 
342 See Appell, supra note 126, at 765. Bias against undocumented immigrants tends to fo-
cus on Hispanic immigrants because they comprise the majority of the undocumented im-
migrant population. See id. at 768; Julian et al., supra note 126, at 31. According to the Urban 
Institute, “Mexicans make up over half of undocumented immigrants—57 percent of the 
total, or about 5.3 million. Another 2.2 million (23 percent) are from other Latin American 
countries. About 10 percent are from Asia, 5 percent from Europe and Canada, and 5 per-
cent from the rest of the world.” Jeffrey S. Passel et al., Undocumented Immigrants: Facts and 
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demned.343 Bias against immigrants and undocumented immigrants in 
particular, however, is widely viewed as acceptable.344 Such discrimina-
tion is not only tolerated, it is frequently encouraged.345 Politicians are 
                                                                                                                      
 
Figures, Urban Institute Immigration Studies Program ( Jan. 12, 2004), http://www. 
urban.org/UploadedPDF/1000587_undoc_immigrants_facts.pdf. 
343 See Ralph Richard Banks & Richard Thompson Ford, (How) Does Unconscious Bias 
Matter?: Law, Politics, and Racial Inequality, 58 Emory L.J. 1053, 1054 (2009). Even individu-
als who harbor personal feelings of bias toward minorities recognize society’s disapproval 
of such feelings and are increasingly unwilling to acknowledge that their actions are the 
result of biased beliefs and assumptions. See id. (noting that the “invocation of unconscious 
bias levels neither accusation nor blame, so much as it identifies a quasi-medical ailment 
that distorts thinking and behavior”). As Professors Banks and Ford note, “[p]eople may 
be willing to acknowledge the possibility of unconscious bias within themselves, even as 
they would vigorously deny harboring conscious bias.” Id. 
344 See David B. Thronson, Of Borders and Best Interests: Examining the Experiences of Un-
documented Immigrants in U.S. Family Courts, 11 Tex. Hisp. J.L. & Pol’y 45, 54–55 (2005) 
(noting the “pervasive societal narrative that constructs an expanding notion of unworthi-
ness and ‘illegality’ regarding undocumented immigrants and a diminished popular sense 
regarding the availability of protection from prejudice and discrimination”); see also Shell 
Games: The “Minutemen” and Vigilante Anti-Immigrant Politics, Building Democracy Initia-
tive: Center for New Community (Oct. 2005), http://www.buildingdemocracy.org/ 
shellgames.pdf [hereinafter The Minutemen] (noting that with regard to immigrants, the 
gains of the civil rights movement “are under attack”). “[A]nti-immigrant sentiment is 
sweeping the country like wildfire. Stoked by political successes in and out of the Beltway 
and fanned by anti-immigrant organizations, nativism has moved from the margins to the 
mainstream.” The Minutemen, supra. 
345 See Thronson, supra note 344, at 55. Even the terminology used to describe un-
documented persons is loaded with implications. Throughout this article, I have used the 
term undocumented immigrant rather than illegal alien. As Dean Kevin Johnson has 
noted the word “alien” has incredible power: 
[It] immediately brings forth rich imagery. One thinks of space invaders seen 
on television and in movies, such as the blockbuster movie Independence Day. 
Popular culture reinforces the idea that aliens may be killed with impunity 
and, if not, “they” will destroy the world as we know it. Synonyms for alien 
have included “stranger, intruder, interloper, . . . outsider, [and] barbarian,” 
all terms that suggest the need for harsh treatment and self-preservation. In 
effect, the term alien serves to dehumanize persons. We have few, if any, legal 
obligations to alien outsiders to the community, though we have obligations 
to persons. Persons have rights while aliens do not. 
Kevin R. Johnson, “Aliens” and the U.S. Immigration Laws: The Social and Legal Construction of 
Nonpersons, 28 U. Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev. 263, 272 (1997) (internal citations omitted). 
“[Eighty-seven] members of the House of Representatives and one member of the Senate 
received an ‘A’ grade in the 110th Congress from the hard-line anti-immigrant organization 
Federation for American Immigration Reform . . . , labeled a hate group by the Southern 
Poverty Law Center.” Press Release, Am. Voice, Anti-Immigrant Members of Congress Hypo-
critical on Worker Prot. Issues (Dec 10, 2009), available at http://americasvoiceonline.org/ 
 press_releases/entry/anti-immigrant_members_of_congress_hypocritical_on_worker_pro- 
tection_issues; see, e.g., Jeannie Kever, Toy Drives Insist They Reject No One: Pair of Houston Chari-
ties Require Registrants to Show Immigration Status, Houston Chron., Dec. 2, 2009, at B1. (de-
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elected because of their anti-immigrant rhetoric, pro-immigrant busi-
nesses are boycotted, and anti-immigrant vigilantes are treated as he-
roes.346 Consequently, the difficulty for undocumented immigrant par-
ents facing a fitness determination is not only that they often lack many 
of the culturally biased attributes of good parents, but that they may 
also be subject to the proliferating negative views of undocumented 
immigrants.347 Additionally, because the language, culture, and values 
associated with undocumented immigrants are openly considered un-
desirable, many may believe that preventing parents from passing these 
attributes to their children are in the children’s best interests.348 Courts 
and child welfare agencies routinely express concerns regarding the 
                                                                                                                      
scribing a Toys for Tots program’s requirement of a valid social security number to receive 
toys). 
346See, e.g. Suzy Khimm, Run For The Border, Steve King’s Coming!, Mother Jones, (Nov. 
10, 2010, 3:00 AM PST), http://motherjones.com/politics/2010/11/steve-king-immig- 
ration-committee (describing two of the most anti-immigrant congressmen); Working to 
Stop Illegal Immigration, Nat’l Illegal Immigr. Boycott Coalition, http://www.illegal 
immigrationboycott.com/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2011). For example, The National Illegal 
Immigrant Boycott Coalition is a political action group created solely for the purpose of 
boycotting “corporations that support illegal immigration.” See Americans Working to Stop 
Illegal Immigration, supra; see also The Minutemen, supra note 344 (describing the “Minute-
men Project” which consists of “armed anti-immigrant vigilantes conducting their own 
‘patrols’”) The report notes: 
After their highly publicized “maneuvers” in April in Arizona, the Minutemen 
Project has spawned at least forty new groups in more than a dozen states. In 
October, Minutemen groups are preparing events in several new states. At-
tracting volunteers and well-wishers from all over the country, the Minutemen 
are the latest and largest in a string of vigilante efforts to “secure” the border 
against the entry of undocumented immigrants. 
See The Minutemen, supra note 344. 
347 See Appell, supra note 126, at 759; Johnson, supra note 345, at 272. “[W]e have in 
this country a long and continuing history of constructing the ideal of ‘mother’ according 
to skin color, religion, culture, national origin, language, ethnicity, class and marital 
status.” Appell, supra note 126, at 759. Mothers who do not meet these norms are most 
likely to lose their motherhood. See id. 
348 See Appell, supra note 126, at 760 (“Women who are compliant, English-speaking, 
not ethnically diverse, White, and middle class are most successful in the child welfare 
system; those who diverge from these norms are [the] most likely to lose their mother-
hood. When mothers lose their children, they lose their chance to pass on their language, 
culture, and values [to] their children.”); see also Santosky 455 U.S. at 763 (noting that “par-
ents subject to termination proceedings are often poor, uneducated, or members of mi-
nority groups, such proceedings are often vulnerable to judgments based on cultural or 
class bias”) (internal citations omitted); David B. Thronson, Choiceless Choices: Deportation 
and the Parent-Child Relationship, 6 Nev. L.J. 1165, 1204 (2000) (noting that “family courts 
can be remarkably parochial and uninformed regarding issues of, and related to, immigra-
tion status and life in other countries”). 
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language, values, and lifestyle of undocumented immigrants in immi-
grant parent termination cases.349 
 Given the dangers of best interest analyses, any reliance on them 
to remove immigrant children from parents should raise concerns.350 
Before a best interest standard, and its attendant weaknesses, is permit-
ted to replace the fitness standard, there must be a clear statement that 
this is an intended and desired change.351 Replacing parental rights 
with a best interest test is an important reversal that must not occur 
unnoticed and unconsidered. 
VI. Public Sentiment 
 History has demonstrated that determining a child’s best interest 
is subjective and can be susceptible to bias.352 Thus, even if the decision 
to place a child’s best interest above parental rights is good in theory, 
its actual implications are unclear. What is clear, however, is that until 
there is widespread recognition of the fact that a best interest analysis is 
being used to justify removals and terminations within undocumented 
families, there can be no meaningful evaluation of the benefits or det-
riments of continuing such actions. 
 Support for these terminations cannot be assumed. The public 
reaction to some of the more publicized terminations creates doubt as 
to whether they are publicly supported.353 For example, when Bathezar-
                                                                                                                      
349 See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 763. 
350 See id. at 760; see also Zug, supra note 15, at 1181–82. 
351 See Zug, supra note 15, at 1181–82. For example, the removal of immigrant children 
may result in long-term foster care rather than adoption. See, e.g., Tracy Vericker et al., 
Latino Children of Immigrants in the Texas Child Welfare System, 22 Protecting Child., 20, no. 
2, 2007 at 29–31 (finding that Latino Immigrant Children were more likely to be placed in 
group homes and institutes and have case goals such as long term family foster care and 
independent living). But see Maldonado, supra note 81, at 1423 (noting that while most 
Americans “prefer to adopt white children, many are willing to accept Asian or Latin 
American children if they cannot adopt a white child or the wait is too long”). In fact, 
“81% of all foreign-born adoptees in the United States[] come from Asia or Latin America 
. . . .” Id. at 1432. Foreign adoptions, however, are difficult: in some instances, “Americans 
have completed an adoption in the foreign country only to learn that the child will not be 
allowed entry into the United States because he or she does not satisfy the definition of an 
‘orphan’ under our immigration laws.” Id. at 1445–46. The adoption of Hispanic immi-
grant children therefore has two “advantages” that may make them more desirable as po-
tential adoptees. See id. at 1425, 1442. First, they are not black, and second, there is little 
likelihood of the parent reappearing in the child’s life at a later date. See id. 
352 See Appell, supra note 126, at 759. 
353 See Shelia Byrd, Mexican Immigrant Gets Baby Back from State, Native Am. Times (Feb. 
22, 2010), available at http://www.nativetimes.com/news/international/3134-mexican-immi- 
grant- gets-baby-back-from-state. 
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Cruz lost custody of her daughter due to her lack of English profi-
ciency, the public loudly disapproved of the state’s actions.354 This reac-
tion led not only to the return of Bathezar-Cruz’s daughter, it also re-
sulted in a potentially significant policy change.355 After the baby’s 
return, Mexico and the State of Mississippi entered into a Memoran-
dum of Understanding.356 Under the agreement, any time the Missis-
sippi Child Welfare Services takes a Mexican minor into custody, it 
agrees to notify the Mexican consulate, consider relative placement— 
including placement in Mexico, request foreign home studies, and “as-
sist Mexican nationals with obtaining permission to cross the border for 
court hearings and related re-unification activities.”357 
 On the other hand, in the case of Anna Mae He, which concerned 
a young girl caught in a custody battle between her American foster 
parents and Chinese biological parents, there was significant public 
support for the judge’s decision to keep her with her foster family.358 
Although some objected to the decision, others commended the judge 
for standing up to “‘the liberals’ to ensure the best interests of the 
child.”359 
 Also telling is proposed national legislation, such as The Humane 
Enforcement and Legal Protections for Separated Children Act (“the 
HELP Act”) and The Immigration and Oversight Fairness Act of 
2009.360 Congress proposed the HELP Act to enable detained, deport-
able parents to maintain contact with their children in the United 
States.361 The HELP Act would provide nationwide protocols to help 
                                                                                                                      
354 See Goel, supra note 279, at 528; Byrd, supra note 353. 
355 See Byrd, supra note 353. 
356 See id. 
357 See Byrd, supra note 358; Dep’t of Human Servs. Div. of Family & Children’s 
Servs., State of Miss., Annual Progress and Services Report 49 (2011), available at 
http://www.mdhs.state.ms.us/pdfs/fcs-apsr2010.pdf. Other states have entered into simi-
lar agreements. See, e.g., Memorandum from Erwin McEwen, to Rules & Procedures Book-
holders & Child Protective & Child Welfare Staff (May 16, 2008), available at http://www. 
state.il.us/DCFS/docs/policyGuides/Policy_Guide_2008.02.pdf. 
358 See Goel, supra note 279, at 528 (discussing the public reaction to the He decision). 
359 Id. 
360 See Press Release, First Focus Campaign for Children, Senate Legislation Protects 
Children and Families Impacted by Immigration Enforcement ( June 22, 2010), available at 
http://www.ffcampaignforchildren.org/news/press-releases/senate-legislation-protects-chil- 
dren-and-families-impacted-by-immigration-enforc (hereinafter Press Release, Campaign 
for Children); Press Release, First Focus, Woolsey, Roybal-Allard Discuss Legislation to 
Mitigate the Impact of Immigration Policy on Children (Nov. 5, 2009), available at http:// 
www.firstfocus.net/news/press_release/woolsey-roybal-allard-discuss-legislation-mitigate-im- 
pact-immigration-policy-chil (hereinafter Press Release, Woolsey). 
361 See Press Release, Campaign for Children, supra note 360. 
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keep children with their parents while the parents’ cases are pending.362 
It recognizes the difficulties faced by detained and deported parents. 
Furthermore, it would ensure regular communication between parents 
and their children, and help detained individuals live with their families 
while their cases are pending.363 Similarly, the proposed Comprehensive 
Immigration Reform for America’s Security and Prosperity Act of 2009 
would permit immigration judges to prevent the deportation of a parent 
of a U.S. citizen child if removal is not in the child’s best interest.364 
 These pieces of legislation demonstrate support for immigrant 
family reunification.365 The proposed bills encourage immigrant family 
reunification and appear to be at odds with the trend toward increasing 
the separation of immigrant families.366 At the same time, the lack of 
traction of these measures in Congress casts doubt on the public’s 
commitment to stopping immigrant family separations.367 It is impossi-
ble to discern a clear policy or even attempt to accurately gauge public 
sentiment on the issue of immigrant family separations.368 It might be 
that the majority of Americans would object to such parental termina-
tion cases. Without more attention given to this issue or a clear policy 
statement against such removals, however, it is likely that the removal of 
children from their undocumented parents will continue to take place. 
                                                                                                                      
362 See id. 
363 Press Release, Woolsey, supra note 360. 
364 See H.R. 4321, 111th Cong. §§ 1, 187 (2009); Comprehensive Immigration Reform ASAP, 
NYS Immigrant Action Fund, http://nysiaf.org/legislation/comprehensive-immigraiont-
reform-asap (last visited Nov. 21, 2011). 
365 See Press Release, Campaign for Children, supra note 360; Press Release, Woolsey, 
supra note 360; Comprehensive Immigrant Reform ASAP, supra note 364. 
366 See Press Release, Campaign for Children, supra note 360; Press Release, Woolsey, su-
pra note 360; Comprehensive Immigrant Reform ASAP, supra note 364. A similar piece of pro-
posed legislation is the Immigration and Oversight Fairness Act of 2009, which would provide 
better treatment to detainees. See Press Release, Congresswoman Lucille Roybal-Allard, Con-
gresswoman Roybal-Allard (CA-34) Introduces Legislation to Ensure the Humane Treatment 
of Immigration Detainees (Feb. 26, 2009), available at http://roybal-allard.house.gov/News/ 
DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=126158. This bill would establish legally enforceable 
detention standards but also increase the use of alternatives to detention for individuals such 
as pregnant women, asylum seekers and families with children. See id. These individuals 
would be placed in programs of supervised release rather than detention. See id. For families 
with children, this would prevent initial separation in many cases as well as create the possibil-
ity of reunification in situations where the children have been removed. See id. 
367 See, e.g., HELP Separated Children Act, H.R. 2607, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 4321. 
368 See Tara Bahrampour, More Laws are Enacted to Help, Not Restrict, Illegal Immigrants, 
Wash. Post, May 11, 2010. This is perhaps not surprising given that U.S. Immigration 
policy in general is mixed. See id. The Arizona immigration laws demonstrate one extreme; 
a study by the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, however, reveals that 
more laws are passed nationwide that expand immigrant rights than contract them. See id. 
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Conclusion 
 The decades-long struggle between children’s and parents’ rights 
is continuing. The ascendancy of children’s rights has had far reaching 
effects and the termination of undocumented immigrant parents’ 
rights is one of the most recent but least noticed. Best interest consid-
erations may justify these terminations. Permitting such considerations 
to support the termination of fit parents’ rights, however, represents a 
substantial law and policy change. This change must be recognized and 
its implications considered before it is permitted to continue. 
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